The concept of God in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers by Struckmeyer, Frederick Raymond
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1963
The concept of God in the
philosophy of Karl Jaspers
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/28158
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Thesis 
THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL JASPERS 
by 
Frederick R. Struckmeyer 
(B.A., The King's College, 1960) 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Haster of Arts 
1963 
.\ 
Second Rea.der. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPY, Erazim V. Kohak 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LIBRAR!~S 
Approved 
» ~ 
First !leader\......: • '.·• ••• ~\;~ ••• 
ASSISTANT IiQ~soR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Second Reader. • • • • • • • • • • • • 
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
S.O.ad Ieider. • • • • • • • • • • • • 
JW)J'IUOR or P'l'ILOa)Pit 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. INTRODUCTION • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
1. Purpose of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
2. Hethodology • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
3. Biographical Data • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 
II. JASPERS' CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Jaspers and the History of Philosophy . . . . . . . 4 
2. Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy: 
The Problem of Interpretation • • • . . . . . 6 
3. The Context of Philosophy in the Human Situation 8 
4. Philosophy and Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
5. The Epistemological Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
6. The Encompassing • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
i. The Being \fuich We Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
a. Empirical Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
b. Consciousness as Such . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
c. Spirit ••• . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
ii. The Encompassing as Being Itself . . . . . . . . 20 
a. The lvorld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
b. Transcendence • • . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
7. Existenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
i. Existenz as a Mode of the Encompassing . . . . . 24 
ii. Existenz and Freedom • • • • • • • • • • . . . . 25 
8. Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Chapter 
III. 
IV. 
Page 
9. The Heaning of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
10. The Role of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
i. The Need for Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
ii. The Nature of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
iii. "Reading" the Symbols: The Possibility of 
Deception • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 37 
iv. The Ascent to God and the Possibility of 
Foundering • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . 
11. Philosophical Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
12. Summary and Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
THE GOD OF TRANSCENDENCE • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1. Prolegomena: The Difficulties Stated . . . . . . . . 
2. The Question of God's Existence. . . • • . . . . . . 
3. Kierkegaard on the Arguments for God . . . . . . . . . 
4. The Unity of God • • • • • • • • • • • • It • • • • • • 
5. God and Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6. Communication ~d th God: Prayer and Hystical Union . . 
7. God as Creator • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
8. God and History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
9. The Problem of Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TFE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION • . . . . . . . . . 
1. The Idea of God for Religion and for Philosophy . . . 
2. Revealed Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
i. General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ii. Biblical Religion • • • • • • • • • • • s • • • • 
39 
41 
48 
48 
53 
56 
58 
60 
67 
71 
73 
73 
'?4 
74 
76 
Chapter Page 
iii. Kierkegaard and Jaspers on the Incarnation • • • 77 
iv. The "Christ Hyth 11 . . . . . . 81 
3. The Continuing Tension Between Philosophy and 
Religion •• . • 83 
. . • 
88 i• J • CONCLUSION • • . . . . . . 
1. Su.m.rn..a.ry . . . . . . . 88 
2. Critical Evaluation • • . . • . • • 92 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 100 
ABSTRACT ••• . . . . . . • . 103 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose of the Tnesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the function of 
the concept of God in the metaphysical philosophy of Karl Jaspers. 
It will be argued that this concept is central to his entire scheme 
of thought, and cannot be isolated from it. A further attempt vJill 
be made to relate Jaspers' use of this concept to some of the tradi-
tional problems of theism, such as freedom, evil, and revelation. 
These considerations will be developed in the light of Jaspers' 
philosophy as a whole, although, for purposes of expository and 
critical scrutiny, it may be necessary to grant them more extended 
treatment than might othervJise be deemed necessary. 
2. Hethodology 
The first chapter of the thesis vrill be given over to intro-
ductory data and a brief survey of the fundamental concepts of 
Jaspers' philosophy, as well as to the problems attending an 
analysis of his terminology. The second chapter will be concerned 
with an exposition of Jaspers' philosophy as a whole, in order to 
ascertain the function of the concept of God in that philosophy. 
Chapter Tnree will survey the manner in which Jaspers characterizes 
the concept of God in specific terms. Tne following chapter vrill 
summarize his vieTtJ of the conflict between philosophy and religion, 
in the specific context of the question of revelation. A final 
1 
chapter will be mainly concerned with some problems "lvhich have been 
encountered, as ~rrell as with a recapitulation of the thesis as a 
whole. 
3. Biographical Data 
Karl Jaspers (1883 - ) is one of the foroflost living 
European philosophers. Originally engaged in psychopathological 
studies, he became increasingly interested in philosophy during the 
years L~ediately following the completion of his studies in psycho-
logy. His original interest in the pathology of personality has not 
been forgotten, however, as may be attested by his irritings on 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Strindberg, and Van Gogh. His important 
early work, Psychologie der VJeltanschauungen, marks Jaspers' transi-
tion from psychology to philosophy. 
An illuminating autobiography of Jaspers is available in 
the Schilpp volume1 dedicated to him. In addition, he has IITitten 
lucidly of his philosophical development in an article entitled 
"l1ein 'deg Zur Pnilosophie. "2 In a passage strikingly similar to 
one found in the Journals of So"ren Kierkegaard, Jaspers tells ho~·J he 
came to realize that the philosophical quest is primarily concerned, 
not with knowing, but v..rith doing.3 hlhile Jaspers' ethical interests 
1Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers 
(New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 5-94. 
2Karl Jaspers, Rechenschaft und Ausblick (H~chen: Piper, 
1951), pp. 320-355. 
3rbid., p. 325. 
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are not the direct concern of this thesis, it ought to be noted that 
they are peripherally important to his philosophy. That is, Jaspers 
has not constructed an explicit system of ethics, although he holds 
ethical consequences to be derivable from his metaphysical viei-J"S. 
Jaspers' philosophical writings are numerous, and his two 
major works- Philosophie and YQu~ Wahrheit- have not yet been 
translated into English. These works will, however, be referred to 
throughout this thesis, since they are both systematic expositions 
of Jaspers' metaphysics. Among Jaspers' other important published 
works are The Perennial Scope of Philosophy (1949)1, Reason and 
Existenz (1935)2, and, most recently, ~Great Philosophers (1962)3. 
1Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philoso}hy, trans. 
Ralph Manheim (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949 • The original 
title, Der Philosophische Glaube, might be translated much more 
accurately as "The Philosophical Faith." 
2Karl Jaspers, Reason ~ Existenz, trans. William Earle (New 
York: Noonday Press, 1955). 
3Karl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, trans. Ralph Manheim 
and ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962). 
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CFJI.PTER II 
JASPERS' CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 
1. Jaspers and the History of Philosophy 
It is no easy task to relate Jaspers concretely or exclu-
sively to any one thinker or school of thought in the history of 
philosophy. His acquaintance with the writings of both Western and 
Eastern philosophers is broad and substantial, a fact quite evident 
in his most recently published work. Discernible throughout his 
i~itings, however, are frequent allusions to such giants as 
Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. 1 
The latter two, especially, have played a critical role in 
the formation of Jaspers' philosophical outlook, although the 
influence of Kant is at least equally pervasive. From Kant he 
gained the insight that no metaphysical system is fully consistent 
with the demands of both reason and experience, and that any trust-
worthy metaphysics must go beyond the subject-object bifurcation as 
traditionally conceived. The Kantian heritage, while obvious in 
Jaspers' "theory" of knowledge, is perhaps even more evident in his 
concern for what Kant called the domain of practical reason. 2 
1For Jaspers' treatment of Augustine as an early philosopher 
of existence, see The Great Philosophers, pp. 175 ff. 
2cf. Walter Kaufmann, "Jaspers' Relation to Nietzsche, 11 
in Schilpp, Jaspers, p. 408. 
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From Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, on the other hand, Jaspers 
derived a keen a1-1areness of the predicament of man in a world torn 
by social, technological, and spiritual revolution. These two 
thinkers are, for him, the "original philosophers of this era, 111 
Jaspers marvels that their message has gone largely unheeded, and 
insists that any "philosophy of the future" must come to grips 
with them if it is to avoid being irrelevant to our age. Specifi-
cally, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche showed that no systematic con-
struction of a philosophical system is any longer possible, at 
least on the old foundations. 
• • • Through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche a mode of 
existential experience has become effective, whose 
consequences on all sides have not yet come to 
light. They posed a question which is not yet clear 
but which one can feel; this question is still open. 
T1rough them we have become aware that for us there 
is no longer any self-evident foundation. There2is no longer any secure background for our thought. 
Of Jaspers' relation to contemporary European philosophy 
little need here be said. A number of studies are available which 
compare Jaspers with such other existentialist and phenomenologist 
thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Harcel. It might be 
mentioned, at this point, that Jaspers has specifically disavowed 
Husserl's phenomenology; he considers the latter to be closer to 
science than to philosophy.3 
1Karl Jaspers, \'Jay to Wisdom, trans. Ralph Nanheim (He-vr 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 188. 
2 Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 47. 
3cf. Jaspers, Rechenschaft und Ausblick, p. 328. 
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The roots of all contemporary existentialism and phenomen-
ology, including the >-rork of Jaspers, go back at least to the mid-
nineteenth century. Paul Tillich has, to my knm-Jledge, written the 
most lucid extant sketch of the development of these movements, 
vJhich he traces mainly to the tmique socio-cultural conditions 
existing at the time such men as Schelling, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, 
1 and Harx 1trore writing their most powerful \fOrks. 
Despite his similarities to tl1ese &Y).d other tl1inkers, 
hm-Iever, Jaspers 1Jrites in an idiom Hhich is often difficult and 
obscure. His fundamental concepts often mean either more or less 
than they have meant for some other thi~~ers. Certain concepts 
appear to have no easily identifiable historical source. It Hill 
ther<~fore be necessary to briefly introduce several of these key 
terns, Hi th the expec,tation that this may further an understanding 
of Jaspers' philosophy as a whole. 
2. Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy: 
Tne Problem of Interpretation 
The problem of language becomes acute TfJhen one attempts to 
interpret a philosopher such as Karl Jaspers. This linguistic 
difficulty is not rooted so much in the latter's style as it is in 
the very concepts which constitute the core of his philosophy. For 
the most part he eschcHS fixed definitions and carefully circum-
1see Paul Tillich, "Existential Pnilosophy: Its ~Iistorical 
I1eaning, " in Theology of Culture, ed. Robert C. Kimball (NevJ York: 
Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 76-lll. 
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scribed concepts, preferring to use what Lohff aptly calls a 
"gliding terminology."1 This preference raises incalculable prob-
lems for the interpreter. 
Jaspers' gliding terminology, of course, merely reflects 
what might be called the 11open-endedness 11 of his philosophy as a 
whole. In the tradition of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, he uses the 
method of "indirect communication" to convey his message. 2 Jaspers' 
system, in fact, is intentionally "unsystematic; 11 that is, his 
thought constitutes a systematically connected, yet 11open, 11 struc-
ture. Hence his terminology tends, for him, to be of secondary 
importance. He refuses to have philosophy degenerate into 11acadernic 
pedantry."J 
Nonetheless Jaspers' terminology does give evidence of a 
certain uniformity. This uniformity may be traced in terms of certain 
basic concepts 1-rhich recur again and again in Jaspers' 1-rritings. In 
general these terms have, for Jaspers, a meaning which is peculiar 
to his mm way of thinking. Occasionally several of these terms 
appear to be inconsistent ~~th one another. Jaspers' belief that a 
11 suspension11 of fixed meanings for philosophical concepts is necessary 
renders such an inconsistency less harmless than might otherN.ise be 
supposed. 
1cf. Von lvenzel Lohff, Glaube ~ Freiheit ( GHtersloh: 
Carl Bertelsmann Verlag, 1957), Einleitung, p. 14. 
2cf. Kurt Hoffman, "Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy," 
in Schilpp, Jaspers, pp. 95 ff. 
3Ibid., p. 96. 
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It is unnecessary, at this point, to introduce the key terms 
in Jaspers' metaphysical philosophy. These 1>1ill be dealt Hith at 
length belo1-r. I!Jhat needs to be kept in mind is that all of these 
terms--- 11Transcendence," "E~dstenz, 11 and the rest---are closely 
related to one another. Apart from Jaspers' universe of discourse 
they may be almost meaningless; within that universe they are indis-
pensable. 
Linguistic difficulties attend the interpretation of almost 
any philosopher. It may be argued that in the case of Jaspers 
these difficulties become paramount. Although the ambiguous terms 
the latter employs will be elucidated as fully as possible, it must 
be remembered that to lay undue stress on terms and concepts themselves 
is to falsify what Jaspers takes to be the main task of the philosophic 
enterprise. What this task is must noH be examined. 
3. The Context of Philosophy in tho Hurn.an SituaJ.:,j_or: 
'i·Jl-1at is philosophy? ~·Jhere does it originate? \mere does it 
lead us? Jaspers believes that these questions are fundamental, in-
deed, inescapable, for contemporary man. Philosophy, in his vievr, is 
nothing less than the journey taken by every man vrho desires to come 
to a knov-rledge of himself and his destiny. 1 It is not so much a system 
of thought as it is a movement of thinking. Thought is never static, 
nor is philosophy. It can only be personally undergone and realized, 
for no definition can adequately convey the nature of philosophy. 2 
1Karl Jaspers, Han in ~ Hodern Age, trans. Eden and Cedar 
Paul (Nevr York: Doubleday Anchor, n.d. ), pp. 175 ff. 
2Jaspers, ~1ay, pp. 12-14. 
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W'nat makes a man philosophize? If nothing else, the fact that 
he experiences conflict, suffering, guilt, and the prospect of death. 
It is just these "ultimate situations, 111 as Jaspers calls them, Hhich 
constantly bring home to man the reality of his situation. They are 
the 11borders, 11 the ''limits, 11 wl.1ich relentlessly impinge upon him, and 
-vrhich offer him no apparent escape. They are, in short, the situations 
in itJhich every ind.i vidual without exception finds himself. To ignore 
or evade them is futile, for man as man cannot overcome his humanity, 
nor the accompanying troubles which force themselves upon hL'11. \mat 
man ~ do is adopt an attitude toward himself and ris situation 
which 1dll enable him to see beyond the l:i.m:i.ted confines of his mm 
existence to the fuller reality of vrhich he is somehow a part. 
Thus philosophizing is a distinctly human activity. It alone 
is capable of giving foundations to man's existence in the contemporary 
world. Jaspers sees organized religion as no longer adequate, partly 
because of the inroads made by science, and partly because of religion's 
proclivity for internal strife. But a quasi-scientific outlook ~·rill 
not suffice either. To surrender the traditional but moribund 
conception of God does not necessarily involve embracing OP~Y the 
Horld. True philosophy aims at having man become himself, and this 
aim can be accomplished only to the extent that r:1an participates in 
reality. Here is the essence of Jaspers' conception of philosophy, 
although much explication is needed regarding what it means for man 
1The German word Grenzsituation literally means ''border 11 or 
"limit" situation. Cf. Karl Jaspers, Philosophie (Berlin: Springer 
Verlag, 1956), II, pp. 201 ff; Way, pp. 19 ff. 
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to ''become himself" and to "participate in reality." 
On the other hand, however, true philosophy is never unaware 
of its historical roots. !'Ian does not live in a vacuum, nor can he 
ignore the thinking of his predecessors. For Jaspers, Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche are the philosophical exemplars of our time. They, as 
few others, saw that the 'ilestern philosophical tradition from 
Parmenides to Hegel, Hhile embodying a kind of unity Hi thin itself, 
could not suffice to supply answers to the questions vrhich modern 
man is asking. The "truth of philosophizing 11 cannot be derived merely 
by surveying the history of philosophy. It must be worked out by man 
himself in his present historical situation, and in terms of the 
finitude which linri. ts man in every age. 1 
4. Philosophy and Ontology 
Jaspers' philosophy is avovredly metaphysical, and he himself 
takes the philosophical task to be primarily a metaphysical one. '.-./hat 
is metaphysics? Stated most simply, it is the search for Being, the 
Being of Transcendence. This search is assisted by the mediation of 
2 the 11symbols 11 of Transcendence, a process whose nuances must be 
exrunined in greater detail below. 
But first we must ask: If philosophy is prli1arily metaphysics, 
and if metaphysics is the quest for Being, is Jaspers attempting to 
construct an ontology? This would appear to be the case, yet Jaspers 
1cf. Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, pp. 22-2). 
2The concept of symbol (or "cipher") is central to Jaspers' 
philosophy. It will be dealt Hith at length belovr. 
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specifically insists that 1-rhat he is doing is .!12.!:. ontology. No 
science of Being is possible, he tells us, although the search for 
Being must never be given up. 1 He grants that, in their peculiar 
historical situations, some earlier philosophers may have been able 
to construct useful ontologies. This is no longer the case. At 
best, we are told, these earlier ontologies share the fate of all 
metaphysical systems---that is, they are pictures (or symbols) of 
reality, whose genuine significance, though often misunderstood, 
resides in their ability to make meaningful~ they symbolize. 2 
No picture can hope to capture or reproduce in rationally 
assli1rllable form the essence of reality. For this reason ontological 
systematizing needs to be aufgehoben, transcended. But, more funda-
mentally, ontology fails because it emphasizes one factor, one aspect 
of reality - viz. objective being - and largely ignores the sub-
jective - intersubjective aspect. 3 Ontologies, for the most part, 
do not come to terms with the reality of human potentiality. 
Metaphysics, in Jaspers' vie-vJ, need not suffer from the defects 
'tfhich have plagued ontological speculation. Metaphysics is a 11construc-
tion of being" in symbolic terms; it only becomes ontology when robbed 
of its contents and made a doctrine. Ontology itself yields no 
knowledge about Being itself; it at best suggests to us the cate-
gories, the modes of thought, under which Being is objectively 
1Jaspers, Phil., III, p. 160. 
2Karl Jaspers, .YQ.u der ~fahrheit (l:1Hnchen: R. Piper Verlag, 
1947), pp. 203 ff. Cf. also Philosophie, III, pp. 160 ff. 
3Jaspers, Ehil·, III, p. 161. 
11 
conceivable.1 
5. The ~pistemological Problem 
Hetaphysics is the quest for Being, as lm have not.::;d. But 
this "quest" is not an i.11personal activity; it is engaged in by 
rational human beinzs, beings who recognize that they .'l.nd t'10 
environment of Hhich they form a part, even sociologically, are not 
identical in any real sense. T..rJ.at is to say, it is impossible, 
epistemologically, to support the monistic :1ypothesis Hhic£1 Hould 
somehocv- identify the knovJer and ''hat he knoHs at the moment of 
cognition. The indubitable epistemological fact, for Jaspers, is 
the subject-object dichotomy. 
The thing that \·re think, of Hhic:, c.Jo speak, is al,v-ays 
something other than ourselves, it is the object 
towards 1rhich vre as subject are oriented. If vJe make 
ourselves into the object of ouri:hinking, He ourselves 
become as it were tho Other, and yet at the same time 
vre remain a thinking I, vrhich thinks about itself 
but cannot aptly be thought o!: as an object because 
it determines the abjectness .of all objects ••• 'Je are 
alHays in this dicl1otomy, alHays oriented tm·rard an 
object, vrhether the object be the r,c;::.lity of our 
sense perception, c·Jhether it be tho corlcept of ideal 
objects, suc!1 as numbers or geometric::tl figures, or 2 uhether it be a fantasy or even an impossible imagining. 
It is ap:;Jarent that the kind of dualisr1 Jaspers here has in mind 
is far ::nol~e radical than that reprosentod by the position 'drlich is 
merely an alternative to 1~l1at might be celled naive realisr:1. He; is 
taking a Kantia.YJ point of departure, since he insists on tho con-
1Jaspers,,Wahrheit, p. 2o4. 
2Jaspers, ~1ay, pp. 29-30. 
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stitutive nature of t:w mind, as ,,Jell as the distinction buLre3n 
the subjective condition of our thinking and tl10 object of lmo;rl.;d;::;:,, 
:lo goes beyond Kant, hotrever, in exte~1ding the; subject-
object bifurcation to the basic structure of man's beint;. 
Kant was primarily concerned v.ri th man as knovrer, vr:12reas 
Jaspers, following Kierkegaard, 1rrishes also to illwninCJ.te the estrange-
mont of man from himself, from his ovm essentio.l reality. It is this 
dualism in subjectivity, and not merely betl·reen the human knoHer and 
the "scientific" "\·JOrld, vhich Jaspers is attempting to o"Jlucidato. 
Is he, tnen, suggestin::; a kind o: idoalism, in \·rhic:1 t~c:; 
totality of reality is unified systematically in some sort o£' a 
ration'll principle? Jaspers often appears to be doi~10 just t~1is, and 
yet it must be remembered that Kierkegaard is just as muc:1 :·1is 
intellectual progenitor as is Kant. Kierkegaard 1 s "dial.:;ctic o;.' 
existence," to use Diem's term, is Hhat Jaspers is appropriating. 
But he does not merely appropriate it; he transforms tiw dial8ctic 
in terms of a w1ique metaphysical conception. This conception is that 
of the ~ncompassing, to Hhich HE) :nust nou turn. 
6 The ~compassing 
It has been sue;gestod that Jaspers conceives o.L Bein::; as 
divided or bifurcated, in tho sense that subject and object - hoc·mver 
the latter is conceived - are ahrays over against one another. Y·;t tl',is 
lcf. Kant 1 s dofini tion of "illusion 11 in t:1e Cri tiaua of Pure 
Reason, trans. :J. K. Smith (London: Uacmillan, 1961), p. ]61 TI 396). 
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lerrissen~eit, this "split," in Being, is not limited to subjectivity, 
for beb:reen objects t~1emselves there is a second dichotomy. In 
naming any particular He distinguish it from every other particular.1 
In effect, according to Jaspers, to particularize is to "extract" an 
objsct from the com.paratively undifferentiated back::;round in -:i1ich it 
existed prior to the moment of cognition. But ,,,hat is thi:3 11baclc::;row"1d?" 
It has boon presupposed in the precedinc; discussion, and a vsry brief 
introduction to the concept t>'l'as given in t~1e first cb:1ptsr. 
It is Hhat Jaspers calls the Sncompassing, and is, as already 
indicated, a concept \vD.ose delimitation is sxtrcmcly difficult. Thr;; 
notion first appears, historically, in ::l.eason and I:xistenz, andre-
ceives its full elaboration in Von der -.ra:lri1eit,2 'l:l8re Jaspcrs 
spends h1mdreds of pages explaining it. It is sufficisnt to simply 
su.vm;1arize here Hhat, to my interpretatio:1, he moans by th·s concept. 
T:l8 reason Jaspers introduces the concept, first of all, io:; 
specifically to avoid t;L~ endless controver::>ies ,rhich nave surrouncbd 
the fw"lda;nontal epistemoloc;ical questions. ;\s :1o hL1self e:;:plcc.i11s: 
p. 790. 
I am urgin~~ to ;;o beyond the divisio:1 bcbTe~m subject 
and object, betwsen the I and the object, and vrit~1 it 
beyond the alternatives, 1·r:1ic:1 are erected bet":roen 
subjectivity and objectivity, Hhere ti1o one is constant-
ly played against the other. l·iy thesis is: Reality 
is neither object nor subject, but that ,.rhich is il-
Jllminated in tho division botlveon subject and object. 
I th . d. . . ' 1 +' ' t' . ' . n 1lS lVlSlOYl, 1101J8Ver, )Oc.d CljVO DOlt' cnanzlng 
forms 'tlhicD. belong to each other. (italics mine). 
1 Jaspers, '.'lay, pp. 30 ff. 
2c-~ 
j_ • ' i.'or an extended treatment, ';Jahrheit, ~rster Toil. 
3Karl Jaspers, 11 i1eply to l·1y Critics, 11 in Schilpp, Jasoers, 
14-
':Jhether Jaspers has in fact supersadod sorn(3 crucial 
epistemological issues remains to be seen. ,\t this point, ~·ri t'1 t£1e 
introduction of b.e notion of the ~1cornpassing, :1:~ :us apparently 
don<:; so. The concept, it is clear, is meant to describe the :.ray in 
Hhich B'.:lin::;, or Reality, is ul tb1a tely "held to ;other. 11 Jaspers 
does ~1ot m1equivocally say t:Jat Reality is "one; 11 neith•:or, :w.revor, 
is it nan,/. :~2 rojocts bot11 an ul timo.te monism a'"ld an ul tir:1ato 
pluro.lism. 
The fucompassin;; is not an "object," nor can it ever become 
an object to us. '.le n::wer really 11thi11k" it, but only c:;.01.in inti-
nations, gli.mpses of it, in r.1W18nts of personal illmninatio;1, It 
is basically a horizon, continuously receding as vJe ssek to approach 
it. The failures of metaphysics, Jasp,:;rs feds, r:1ay be tro.cud to 
the~ rafusal on t:1e part of some philosophers to recognize tlwt Being 
is in A. very real sense unapproachable and ind::Jscribable. 
That Beine; is describable at all is a state o.~ affairs crhich 
Jaspers does not quite explain. Psrl'1aps its doscribability is self-
justifyin:::;. At any rats, Jaspers proceeds to ;;ive us a phenomena-
logical clarification of H~wt ho l11e:1ns by tho :it1co:c1passin3. ?irst 
of all, it must be noted that he distinc:;uislles broadly bet·.wen "t'.:v:; 
being that T,re are" and "Being itself. 11 1 These a•·" t~c tT.JO funda.:nental 
"nod::;s" of the ~~ncompassing; they are "polar, 11 but cJvid;Jntly not i·1 
any irreconcilable sense, as ':ie have seen. They are polar for 
finitude only, for minds \•rhich cannot cmbracCJ the u~:.olo o' :\oality. 
1cf., o.g. Jaspers, Reason and ~istenz, pp. 52-53, ff. 
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Let us first examine that mode of the ::ncorapassin;_; 1rhich Jaspers 
designates "the being Hhicl1 ·v;e are. 11 
i. The Being vlhich ~'le )\re 
a. }upirical ;x:istence 
T'ne "being 1-r:1icn He are," as the very phrase i."'llplies, refers 
to that reaJ.rn of being which surrounds and envelopes subjectivity, 
taking that word in its broadest sense. But :-rhat is a "subject," 
an individual? At the very least, subjectivity involves vJhat Jaspers 
designates "empirical eY...istence," or Dasein (literally "being-there"). 
Tnis is by all accou.nts the most obvious level of the bein~ 1-rhich 
we are, taking "obvious 11 to refer prirnarily to sensible aHareness of 
one's o"l-m existence as "\-Tell as that of others. T'ne level of Dasein 
is the level of physical and social behavior, behavior \.,;hich lS 
observable and susceptible to calculation by the methodologies of 
sociology, anthropology, and psychology (at least psychology of a 
behavioristic sort).1 As empirically existent, maD is a discrete 
individual-amon6-individuals. 
By "empirical existence," then, Jaspers has in mind primarily 
the physical characteristics of individuality; persons have bodies, 
1-rhich as "matter" interact Hith the material ~-rorld of Hhich they 
form a part. Nature, too, is material; hence tho possibility and 
actuality of interaction. But here a question arises: If ~·latu;~e 
is somehovJ an "other" to man (as is the Horld), is not man merely 
1cf. Jaspers, Scope, p. 13. 
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a determined being, one among others? Jaspers aillaits1 that, as 
dasoin, man is larr.;ely determined by the Horld and nature. As more 
than empirical e:;dstonco, hoHever, he is free - a.lthough tho natUl·e 
of this freedom must a>Jait extensive clarification. 
b. Consciousness as Such 
The second modo of the Sncompassing; 'rhich \·Je are Jaspers 
desiQ;nates consciousness as such (Bewtisztsein tiborhaupt). By this 
ter;n he means to indicat'" the level of intell::;ction or conscious 
understanding, Hhereby "we confront tangible things, and to a cor-
tain mea sura ••• succrJed in obtaining compelling and uni vors ally valid 
knowledge, but always of determinate objects. ''2 Consciousnoss as 
such is roughly equivalent to the Kantian "und:crstanding, 11 except 
that Jaspers uould not, I think, subscribe to Kant's delinention of 
tho categories.) 
Consciousness, then, refers to tho entire thinking apparatus, 
or rather the \Jhole thinking process. But even here a distinction 
is necessary. On the one hand, Jaspers tells us, vre are "conscious 11 
in the sens(~ that vJe may become "possible objects of empirical investi-
gation". T'nat is, vJe knmv ourselves to be at least partially subject 
to analysis. '<lore this not the case, none of the human sciences "tmuld 
be possible; in fact, no knoHledgo of any deter;ninato, concret-2 sort 
T,muld bo possible, at least in torms of external reference;. 
1Jaspers, Reason and ::xistenz, pp. )4-55. Cf. 'Jahrheit, pp. 53 ff. 
2Jaspers, 1Jay, p. )2. 
)Although a second volu.'11e of the Philosophical Logic - of r:;hich 
'Jahrheit forms the first part - '\vas to have dealt '1-Jith the question of 
categories, Jaspers never published this volume. 
17 
But \-Ihen this has been said, Jaspers reminds us, 1"Je need to 
remember that consciousness is not limited to perusing the empirically 
observable. r.ran, he might say, is not r,.:;ally limited by the bl~ain-
state \,rl1ic:1 l1e l1ap}:>G11s to be passinG throut;h at a particular lnor~lcnt. 
He is not merely a sin;;lo consciousness, but shares in a larc;cr, 
universal consciousness - consciousness as such. \'iho,t this "universal 
consciousness" is has already been hinted at. J2.spers calls it an 
"infinite Sncompassing," and says it is characterized by a timeless 
quality, a certain "inactuality," as differentiated from our "temporal 
a.ctuali ty. "1 
Consciousness as such is in a certain sense the connecting 
link betHeen man's finite limitations and infinite possibilities. It 
is no longer Dasein, because the purely empirico.l quality of existence 
has been "transcended" (a word Hhich c·Jill receive considerable further 
elaboration). Consciousness in general points us to a ncru sense o: 
the ::::ncompassing, the raode vrhich Jaspers calls "spirit. 11 
c. Spirit 
The third mode of t~1e :encompassing vrhich 'de arc, spirit ( ::Xeist), 
may be seem as complemc;nting the realn of consciousness. It has much 
in common Hith both Dascin and consciousness as such; it is 11real 11 in 
a sr:mse analogous to their reality, and yet its source is different. 
,., 
This is 1-Jl1at distinc;uishes it from the preceding modes. L 
1Jaspors, }\cason and :.=:.'Cistonz, pp. 56-5?. On this Hhol:; section, 
cf. the larger discussion in 'Jahrheit, pp. 61t--70. 
2Jaspers, ~Jihrhcit, p. 71. 
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Spirit is 11tl.1e totality of intelligible thought, o.ction, ond feeling -
a totality \..rhich is not o. closed object for knoulcdge, but ro;Tiains 
Idea. n1 
Spirit, then, is for Jaspers a rr::lectional princi;;lc, or rather 
a relational nrocoss. Perhaps mind Hould be a better tGr:'l to ic.'1dicatc 
his intention tl1an 11spiri t, 11 for the fornF::r term ~as 1 :1istoricc'.ll;y 1 
been usod norc often than the latter to suggest a unifyint; menc.<:.l 
activity. In any case, Hhat Jaspers means by t~10 term is far broader 
than merely mental activity as such, or co;;:;nition of objGcts. Hs 
means by it tho Hhole complex of activities uhich characterize the 
total man - feeling, thinking, "Jillinc, aspiring.2 This complex unity 
is not capable of boing investigated in the 1ray in nhich ':Je investigate 
a natural object, but must be 11undorstood from 1rithin. n3 
Tho throe modes of the Sncompassin;s 1rhich have becm briefly 
sketched above are not, as J01spcrs points out, to be taken as sepa:cablo 
11facts, 11 nor can they be understood i.'1 isolation from on0 another. 
They represent thrae sto.rting points, as it vrere, .from cT~liCll an mrare-
,, 
ness of comprohensi vc Being can begin to becoi~lO real to us.'~ T'::1s 
different r110des have an ostensive function; th()y point to tho unified 
illcompassing Hhich is reflected i.n each one and yet not oxh.austed in 
any. 
T'nore is a i'ourth mode of the :~~ncom;;:>assinc Hhiclt cJc are, 1-rhich is 
1 Jaspers, .?.eason and Jxistcmz, D. 57. 
. -- . 
',-Jahrrwit, pp. 71-76. 
3Jaspors 1 Reason and 2:xistenz, p. 53. 
4Ibid. 
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related to the above three and yet is tl~ansccndent to all of them. 
This is the state of illwnination Hhich Jaspers refers to as .~xistcnz. 
'.Jhat this conccl)t involv::;s must aHait clarification belor·r. 
First it must be noted, or rat:1or recalled, that He have been 
spoaking of bein::; as it is for us. :Ji1.on the question is l'aised 
uhether this ret,llrl of subjoctivs being is ti1e uhole of Boinz, J aspsrs 
insists that t!:1e ansner must be ne:;ative. The; ·~ncompassins includos 
not merely tl:e bein~; Hhicl1 He are, in its v.::n~ious mod:_os, but ::tlso 
Bcinr; itsoli', :Jhose t',;o asnects ar·3 t~u · ..rorld and TreJ1Sconcknce. 
r.:;ach of these must nocr be considered scpal·ately. 
ii. Th:e ..::~1compassing as Beb.;:; It~;;:;lf 
a. The i:Jorld 
The 1\rorld, 11 as Jaspcars conceives it, is not to be taken as 
objcct, but rather as idea. His Idealistic hcrita;;e is hc)r3 apparent, 
and Nen mor"; apparent is the Kantian distinction bet~rcen thinc;s 2.s 
perc oi vcd and thin:::;s in themselves. This dis tinctior~, ?.s Hs shall 
soe, Hill apply as Holl to the relationship batu;:;en ~xistenz and 
Transc0:r.donco. ':Io kno~J the ~rorld as it is :::.~,;pl~as,mtod to us, and not 
as it is "in itself. 11 
Subjccti ve exp::;ri::;nce, in terms o5: tl1:c be in:; -;rhic~l u:~ a2·2, 
rof.:;rs b;:;yond itself. 1 Jas:;ers her"o do•es not oven consido)r th::: 
question of solipsis::1. "ilo takes it for :.;r.:mtod that fil·st-:~x;rson:1l 
c;xporionco is not exclusive, if only because of tll3 "limits 11 :,re 
1 Ibid. , p. 59. 
20 
encounter in attem.pting to ex'Jlain our subjc;ctivcc c)X<Jcri<;nc-os. In 
as kine; the question of an origin to our train of cxpcrlcnc ?.s, ~re 
find that no anscrer is possible but t11at t:1or3 exists out::>icb of 
us a vrorld of 11fact 11 to ~-rhich He are somehou l'(~lated. 
This realm of l'acticity is, ilOH8Vor, unknouable 2.part from 
Ut<3 subjective apparatus ~Jit~n Hhich ~re apprehend it. The c·mrld 
exists independently of rrJ.y cognizing it, but in the act of cognition 
I 11 croate the form 11 of everything I come to kno.,;,r. 1 I do not create the 
object per se; I only determine its forn. At this point, B.S suggested 
above, Jaspers is quit::; Kantian. 
BeL."lg itself is that ~-J}lich sh01-rs an i:mmeasurab1c number 
of ap1)oarances to inquiry, but it i tsolf alvro.ys r2codes 
ond only manifests itself indirectly as that detcm1lin-
ato empirical existence vrc encounter in t~1e ::n·ogrcs::; 
of our experiences and in the rc;;ularity of procs:::;~os 
in all their particularity. ',h call it th:_; ·:rorld.-
The Horld is an 11othcr 11 for me, althouc;h in another sense I 
am merely a part of it. 1iJhat Jaspors seems to b~; sayir.;.:!: is that 
the scientific Horld is explainable largely in impersonal terms, 
but that t:-10 ~.vor ld, as . :;ncompassing, is finally more than science 
can knou about it.3 
~J:1.at can vro knm·r about the 'mrld? In t(3rms of scientific 
11lmmnng 11 (1·Jissen), \Je can apparently knovr a great deal. Bu.t th8 
Horld itself can be 11knom1 11 only through the activity of transconding. 
1Ibid., n. 60. Yet, as Jaspers e1n~J:1asizc;s in ~Ja~1r~1eit (p. 86), 
-- ·' 11tho 1mrld is, in itself, nothing. 11 It assum;.;s fo;.~m, bscomes mno.ning-
ful, only for a knovrer. 
2I,.' OlQ. 
3cr. Jaspers, ::rahrhoi t, pp. 90-91. 
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To kno1,r the 1-Jorld and to knovJ the ~ncompassing of the 1vorld are t•:JO 
different things. The latter knmvledge is not 11factual' II o'J.t---if 
this term may be allm-red--- 11 intuitive. 11 It involves the realization 
that the 1vorld is more than its appearances, that it is not fully 
comprehensible, that the question of its origin must remain unans;wr-
able, a..11d that the appearance of man cannot be explained in terms of 
the 1wrld-process itself. 1 
The I·Jor ld is, in short, not self-explanatory, nor is it the 
cJhole of Being itself. !Jere it so, man VIould not be fr0e, nor vmuld 
he possess the capability of becoming himself. This is the problem 
vlhich all monistic naturalisms must faco. Jaspers insists that the 
vJOrld is one limit (Gronze) vJhic:1 confronts us, but it is not the only 
2 
. t p t' ' . t' . t t one. J\.S one aspec OJ. ne ::ncompas.slng o ner, l mus· be soon in 
its relationship to Transcendence, a relationship srhich must no·.: be 
briefly characterized. 
b. Transcendence 
The concept of Transcendence (or, as for religion, 11 God') is, 
for Jaspers, inseparable from the idea of the \-JOrld. The bro ::o..ro 
mutually interdependent; one cannot be understood apart from the 
other. But how is their relationsh.ip to be conceived? They are, as 
T-Ie have already seen, different aspects of the -:;'ncompassing as Beine; 
itself. But het.J are they different? Is more value to be placed on 
one than on the other? Jaspers provides no unambiguous ansvTers to 
1cf. Ibid, pp. 91-107. 
2Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
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these questions, at least to my interpretation. ~e rejects the 
naturalistic position, as we hava already noted, because it makes 
.1an into a mechanical microcosm and robs him of his .fresdom. On the 
ot:Br hand, he also rejects the vie!rJ of 11 classical 11 theism, ;v-hich 
sess God as simply over against the \-Vorld as its creator and sustain::;r. 1 
::Jhether this rejection is justified is a question ':J!'lich must 
temporarily remain unanswered. 
The position Jaspers does se-8m to espouse, as "'.-Je have adumbrated 
above, is one from vJhich the 1v-orld is seen as 11 transpa.rent 11 to tl1e 
Transcendence 1.vhich speaks through it. This is a crucial notion 
r,Jhich uill receive considerable further attention. At this point, it 
is important to note that the concept of the '-Iorld is for him one 
-v.r'clich ought to push us on beyond the world, to the point 1r1here He ask 
the primal question of the ground of our being. T:lis "question 11 is 
Transcendencc. 2 
"Transcendence 11 as a metaphysical concept l1as, in Jaspers 1 
usar_;e, many synonyms. /\lllong them are 11aut'1entic Bein~:;, 11 "~1c.3.l Trans-
cendonce, 11 and t11e 11 Encompassing of 8ncompassing. " tUl of tl-1ess terms 
of course have the sa11e referent, and Jaspers o:::·ton appoars to use 
them interchangeably. Their very multiplicity, hoiJever, tends to 
raise certain problems of interpretation.) 
1.-Je have seen tll.at Transcendence is related to the 1\/0l·ld. 
This relationship, is however, S•3condary. :Jhat is of primary import-
1Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
2 
Jaspers, lbason and :~xistenz, p. 60. 
J 2. g. , does "-?3al Transcendence" :nean anythins more ti1an 
. merely "Transcendence? n 
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ance is the sense in •rhich the :~ncompassing of God is related to ~ 
being. Tne funda..'llental question, then, is: :io1J is Transccmdence 
related to Sxistenz? ~"lhat, in fact, doos it~ to "transcend", 
to attain Sxistenz? 
?. ~xistenz 
i. ;;.xistenz as ::t i1ode of the Z.11.compassing 
/\.'1 importo.nt preliminary distinction nnods to be :n.ade botrr::;3n 
Transcendence as such and the act of transcending. TD.o for!'ler is 
".:teal 11 Transcendence, i.e. "total 11 or absol'.lte Tl'a.nscendc;nce. t\.s 
finite beings, He, on the other l1and, have the potenti3.lity only o.L' 
transcending all of the modes of the :11compassing uhich •:Je ar•~. 1 In 
this act of transcending, ho~rrever, the individual at once a tt9.ins 
his true selfhood and a unique relationship to the Transcendant 
Deity. 
.'Jdstenz, the name Jaspers gives to this unique act of self-
transcending, is in part less definable t~1.an some of t:v:) other con-
copts he -:;mploys. In the Philosophie2 he speaks of ~istenzm~lv:Jllun;;; 
else-vrhere he uses the ecpression "potential i~dstonz. 11 All of these 
terms connote an activity of the self in its quost fol~ the B)in;:; 
vrhich lies beyond it. ;ilone rofers sirn~ly to dasein. 
In relation to the other modes of 
are, 2.:xistenz is a fourth such mode, and y·at bot>_ presupposes and sur-
1 Jaspers, 1Aahrhoit, pp. 108-109. 
2 Jaspers, Phil., II, passim. 
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passes the other three. It gives meaninct to 'JVery modo of the ·~n-
com9assing Hhich \·Je arc. ::::Xistenz, it is clear, embraces t~1e doepest, 
most profound exporiences o:f ~-rhich men capable. L'1 this state or 
act human bc;i:'1t_;S attain those "peak experio1ee:.:; 11 r.rhich m.:;~.ke their lives 
ultimately significant. This is the arena o;" 11 aut~1cntic s:Jlf:1ood, 11 
Hhc;ro an individual is :3i:.nul taneously bot:1 truly hi~tlS oL.' and truly 
confronted by Transcendunc~;. In knovri.ng hi::lS·?l.C, 11(; i~1 c. vit::.l s''~:1sn 
comes to knmJ God as \·Jell. God is ncvcJ.' lmo·.m "dir2ctly, " :1o1rcvcr, 
as Hill become evident belo\·J; only through sy:r.bols docs Tra.nsc.:mde:1c::; 
shm-J itsulf. 
The modes of the ~hcompassing Hhich t-!3 ar·3---Dasein, conscious-
ness as such, .:.nd spirit---are 1rrhat Jaspers c.:1lls the animation of 
~stenz. They are the "matter" 1rrhich is "inforDed 11 by Transcendence. 1 
They allo'·T for an objectification of the message of Transcendence, 
even V1ough this message is thereby distortsd. In tlw :wrld, 
I encountsr only ~is tenz . God, 
2 is not to be found. 'iere is the focal point of Jaspers 1 2:1t:i_re 
philosopD.y. 
ii. ':..'1:istenz and Fre edo:-:1. 
Thc3 question of hwnan froedom, as ':Is mic;:1t ::xpcct, is not 
dealt 1·Jith by Jaspers in traditional fashion. .1e does not evan con-
sider the possibility tho.t ~nan may ulti.rnately bs determined. \.s 
far as he is concerned, "determinism, 11 if it means anythin;; ~tt a.ll, 
1Jaspc3rs, '.Jahrheit, p. 109 
2Jaspers, Phil., III, p. 126. 
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retains this meaning only for the empirical \•JO::::-ld. ~·hn 1 s inner 
lifs cannot be l'egulatcd, at its dcepost points, by the f.:wtors .:~1ich 
control empirical existence. 
'.lhat is fro:,"dom? Or, to pi1rase the question as Jaspers 
Hould, :·Jhen am I fre c? 1 Jaspers replies: 
Donn frei bin ich nur dann, vJelm lc:-l in mir einc Un'l.bhHncigkcit 
von allem Heltsein und von meinem oi~on~n Dasein orrelcn::;, 
d.h. uenn ich gogentiber allem Dasein, Becmsztsein, Geist vor 
der Tranzendenz als dem eigentlich Scicndcm stche. nlein 
der Tranzcndenz kann ich mich restlos hingeben, vJb'h:::-ond J:;dc 
Eingabo an ein ~Ioltscin, in allor Unbedingthcit dss ~ins:1tzos 
ftir dieses, doch unter Bedingun;:;en bleibt, die auc d8r 
Tranzendcnz surec'non im Hedium des absolutr:m Bouusz tseins 
der ~xistenz. 2 
Freedom, Jaspers is sa;<,ring, is to be found only in t:'"le 
attainrnent of :mstenz before Transcendence, in lJhich state all of 
the fetters of lesser states of being cease to bind me. But this 
explanation needs to be qualified, for Jaspc;rs apparently is not 
suggestins that freedom is utter detaclnnent from one's c-lorldly Clloorings, 
but rather the "essence" of ;;.cistenz in t':lo situation of Dasein.J 
In regard to the question o.f choice, Jaspers says that fresdon: 
L.'Tipli8s at least the possibility of choice~, altl.tough the factors of 
chance and accident cannot be excluded in any ;;ivon situation. In 
this sense a cl:.oice may be determined by factors H~lich are unknocm 
at the tilne of choosin:;. 
1 This is precisely hovJ Ber;;son 
implication is that man is really free 
Time and Free 1ilill, Chap. J. 
2J T rah ' ' t 110 aspers, ~ rnel , p. 
states the question. 
only at certain times. 
3cf. Jaspers, Phil., III, pp. 63 ff. 
The 
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These factors arc primarily to be found in t:1e \Jo::·ld of 
11
naturo, 11 tho realm vrhich lim.its Dasoin to [?.. very groat d.Jgroc, 
But, Jaspers goes on to say, in tra.YJ.sc.3nding I nust attempt to con-
ceivrJ of the identity of nature and freedom, hovrcver irreconcilable these 
th·o spheres may finally seem to be. 1 
IJegatively, the height of freedom is to be fou..'1d in the 
realm of thought. Positively, hm-Ievor, it is to be found in :C:xistonz. 
Tho f:C':;edom of :::Jcistcmz begins in thinking, but it need not r:lnd there>. 2 
F:c-0edom is, in that sphere, an "idea, 11 but ::Jcist(:mz is far ::1or'J than 
an idea. It is fundcunentally an attitude toHard Tra..nsconde:1cc 
·.rhich, at its highest, ;dshos itself to h3 united '.rith Transcendence. 
This state, rlO\Jever, can never be attained, for at the point of 
closest proximity to Transcendence, one is ;::>a.radoxically the fart~r1est 
aHay.3 
~;.Je have been speakine; above of human .freedom. '!f:1at Jaspers 
says about the divine frec;do:n Hill be considered in a later chapter. 
':Jhethr;;r Jaspers has in fact clarified the n.'l.turc of h1..11nan froedo::n is 
a que:::;tion Hhich must be left in suspension for the present. 
8. rt.eason 
Reason (Vernunft) plays a crucial role in Jaspers 1 r12taphysics, 
for it is the unifying bond '•Jhich brings together all o": t~u modes 
of the .:;ncompassing. That is to say, reason is in so:Jls scnsD able 
1cf. Ibid; p. 22s. 
2Ibid; pp. 64-65. 
Jibid; n. 65. 
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to correlate everyt~ing Hhich falls Hi thin the pals of c~xpc;rience, 
relating all of these spheres to the iundLJlncmtal quest for both 
Transcendence and true ::X:istenz. 
Reason, in Jaspers' usage, obviously is not merely a 
technical faculty 1;,rhich is thc3 possession of int:;lli~::cnt ltiGl"er 
anir1als. ilo rejects all attempts to restrict reason to "clr3ar, 
objective thinking. n1 ".Iith Kant, Jaspers c-rishc;s to sec reason con-
ceived of not merely as understanding (Verstand), but as a faculty 
with a much broader scope. This do,;s not imply, ~1m-1ever, t~at 
reason is "broad" in the sense that it is able to obtain veridical 
knmv-ledge about the nature of the Horld. c\s ',-Je sac-T earlier, Jaspers 
refuses to speak on terms of a subject-object dualism; thus reason's 
function is not uriDJ.arily to correlate perceptual data. 
?..ather, as 1\8 have suggested, reason is for him a "bond; 11 it 
refers to 'tho pre-eminence of thought in all modes of the :ncom-
passin;;. 112 Jaspers tends to speak of reason mstaphorically; it is, 
he says, "the inextinguishable impulse to philoso:J~1ize; 11 it is 
"movement, 11 "unrest. 11 3 All of these metaph01~s speak o:i' an activity 
1-Jhich Jaspers does not Hish to see restricted to any one mode of the 
:-ncompassing, for it is the process Hhich unites them all. 
:\.eason bears a peculiar relationship to hlstenz ,hov.rever, in 
that it is the latter's opposite pole. Yet the b\To are, paradoxically, 
mutually interdependent, and neither can exist vrithout the other • L"l 
1 But he does not go so far as Tillich, vrho ~:::rants reason a 
kind of ontological status. Cf. Systematic Theology, I. 
2 Jaspers, lleason and .~d.stenz, p. 65. 
3roid., pp. 64,65. 
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vmrds 1-Jhich obviously paraphrase Kant, Jaspers says: 11 ;:xistenz 
only becomes clear through reason; reason only has content through 
·:;;o_stenz ••• As the concepts of t11e understandinz are empty 1-Ji thout 
intuition, so reason is hollovr Hithout ~:xistenz. 11 1 
:2.cason thus is open-ended, inconclusive. It does not give 
us knoulede;e, at least not in the sense of 2 possession. Rather it 
is a driving fore e Hhich urges us beyond its ordinary er.1plo;ymen t ; 
it urges us to search for the ground of our being. It does this, 
0 
Jaspers tolls us, by means of a "total uill l:.o conJ:Iunication. uc~ 
=Lre i.s tho clue to Jaspers 1 c-Jhole use of reason; its pri1.1a::.7 function 
is to "push 11 us beyond ourselves as v.re cmnmonly are, and to make us 
dissatisfic;d vrith ovcr;y state of mind Hhicl1 doc's not nov:" beyond its 
imrnediato confin0s. 
9. The i·le aning of Truth 
If reason, then, is an active "movement," and is never merely 
a receptive faculty, ca11 there be any quostio11 of "trut:1 tt 01._ false-
hood" in regard to its employment? Jaspers evidently thinks there 
can, but not in any ordinary sense. Trutl1 L not a quality of pro-
positions, but of behavior (or, more accurately, oi' attitude). It is 
11 a phenomenon of our ~1umanity 11 3 Hhich is represented throu:)l our 
participation in a community oi' rational beings. Thus truth is 
inseparable from communicability: no man lives to nimself. Does 
1Ibid., pp. 66-67 
2Jaspers, Hahrheit, p. 115. 
J Jaspers, Reason and :Xistenz, p. 77. It ·Hill become apparent 
that Jaspers does not consistently abstain from <1.Scribing truth or 
falsehood to propositions. Seo belovr, p. 34. 
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this imply that there may be a truth common to all :'!on, 3.nd crhic~1 all 
of thorn must or ought to l~ecognize? Jasporc; :tvoids draTcJin; this 
conclusion by focusing instead on the _)lco::npas::;iflg uhicl:1 ::1'' asserts 
is reflected in all cornmu:1ication. Thus lltrut:1 11 is in Jasners' 
vocabulary an evanesc,:;nt concept; it a;::r;x)o.rs to bccomG pros;rcssively 
rr.oro abstract in its various usa;;es. This S'c;ems to be :1L; intentio:1. 
arc .1ns its 11appropriate 11 S8nse of trut:1. lor 3fi1Dirical 8J:isto11Ce, 
the 11true 11 is a fUl1ction of useful consequcnc·:;s; !!truth !I is '18rc; a 
distinctly pragmatic concept. 1 For consciousness as such, on the 
other hand, truth has more than a merely practical meaninc. The 
intellect demands cogency, a certain 11 corrcctn2ss,ll such as is 
afforded by a matl1era2.tical proof. An even hi::;her level oi~ truth is 
demanded by the realm of spirit, vrhore neither usefulness nor avon 
cogency are sufficient. =fure it is the entire person who demands 
truth. This demand can be satisfied only ~-r:1en full conviction is 
attai::JCd, a state of cc;rtainty -.:rhich 8mbraces ;nore than t1Ll ~:wrely 
correct or pro.ctical. 2 
But trl8 t~1ree basic !nodes of our ~c1compassin::;, despite t~.1eir 
attain to thG l1ig:1'o;st lovcl. In one sense, J aspGr::> insists, this 
higL1est level can never be roached. TI1at is, no l'ol~m o:.':' trut:·1 i.s ever 
absolute. 3 'it1at must be striven for is th" :1ighost de;;ree of com:rnunic-
1Jaspers, Reason ~~d Sxistenz, p. 8). 
2Ibid. 
Jibid., p. 98. 
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D.tion of Hhich T.JC aro ca[-Jable. Truth thus oug~ t to be a ''total Hill 
to COliJJllllil.ication, 11 a desire to relate to oth2r beings to the fullest 
lJossible extent. But the presuppositioYl of this cTill to communicate~ 
is =:::istenz, \·rhich becomes real only in terms of its relationship to 
t . ~ . t 1 ano :10r ..:,xls enz. It is in terms of Sxistenz, H~ich is t11c cul:nina-
tion of the other modes of the Encomp.:1ssing c·rhic:1 -r.-re are, that truth 
attains its l1ig110st moaning. llore truth is sc ccn as a quali t;y of 
hu11an relationships at their profom1dc3St. 
:~von at this deepest level, ho·,rever, reason }las not b~;on 
abando~ned; rather, l-.ationa.lit.y hero attains its co1aplotion, its 
fullest inclusiveness. lYJ. comn1m1ication tl.1e total person is invol v0d. 
;\nd yet, the goal of "total communication 11 can never actually be 
attained. It is an ideal limit toT.rard i·:hich 1·m strive, des pits 
r0poat-ed failures and frustrations. In so doi~1t;, ho-,Jsvor, TiC~ attain 
"the despest openness for Transcendence. 112 .\lthoug:1 every form of 
truth must be shipHrecked in the -c.rorld, the nevor-cmding concern 
for truth drives us tmv-ard Transcendence. Tra.YJ.scGndonC•3 alone forces 
us to the conclusion that truth must bo. Yet, if i.J2 sil:.ply say that 
"God is the Trutn, 11 cle do not say anyt:J.in:=; Hhicl:l is rationally 
coramunicablc. This statc:c10nt has existential ;:cwanln; only. 
In sayin:.:; all of this I think Jaspe~~s has touch::;d upon sone 
j_'Uportant issues. Truth is certain~y a far more complex mattcl~ than 
some '3pistemologists ]:lave imagined; this much is certain. 
1 Ibid., P· 92. 
2r ·d 
...92:..;_. ' p. 96 . 
J1 
32 
_Iouover, it seems that Jaspers has gone too far in the opposite di:-ec-
tion; he goes so far, in fact, as to suppose that truth can be 
distin2;uished from falsehood by means of a particular criterion. 
Truth, :1:) tells us, is alc·rays mul tinle (;;ts -vmll o.s "simple," 
"co~1.ercmt, 11 and "infinite.)' 11Falsshood, 11 on t~1e othel~ h.:md, is 
characteristically ''self-destroying, 11 and "ths to-be-measured, n1 
It is obvious that tl1is artificial distinction is not cspc.ble 
of consistent support. ~.]hat Jaspers really intends to say is tint 
lli1ivcrsal stato:~1:mts arc om~ c:1ief wodols of "ths i'alss. " Suc~1 state-
ments m~o alono demonstrably indemonstrc.ble. 2 Tiwro can bo no 
"objective" criterion of truth.J If this is the ca.sco, ~loucv::;r, ::rhat 
profit is there in oiscussing "truth 11 at all? and -,,;_lY is tlvn~e ncar·ly 
univGl~sal agreemont about ~ proposition.s? Jazspc:.:'S avoids th3se 
questions, but only, I think, at the expensG of his metaphysical 
system as a vJholo. If truth is to hav2 mar::; than a purely private 
meaning, uo cannot avoid introducing some kind of a cormnon criterion. 
Admittedly, Jaspers doc;s try to e;ivc somo sort of sts.bility 
to t':1c term "truth" by:relatinc; it to t~w :ctcrno.lity of Transcendence. 
But tllo ."!:'act that Transcondcmco is "hidden" .:'or r.W.I1 rw2.ns t:w.t t~1is 
fixed point of r:;fercnce can never really h~ aP.:i·::;alod to. T:v:: )~~o-
position "God is tflC Trut~1., 11 since it ca..11 corr,;spond rrith no t~npo:c'al 
truth, must rmnain unconfirmed, It iE> an id,3,'1. 'Ji1icl1 nust ::_~o~;io.il1 
1 Jaspers, Scopo, p. 1L1-7. 
2~., p. 148. 
3c ~ J S " T.T :-,.,..110l• t p I. a peru, oJ3..i.u .. l" , _,_• 1-I-88. 
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·.·.~C- a1·1l' .'•1b•.c·.c-~'ully to a 1'-,l· "'~ . 711l. c' l. '" 'o~·r d ' ' . 
• l;co "'o v. i .:1 ,_, '-":i 011' clWilal1 e.l).]J:::'C 'J::)nSl0~1. 
'ri:w ilnplications of tr1is position for J aspors' toto.l vir;u 
of 3-od aro considerabl?l. If Tr.'LYlSc·~ndencc (or, God) i;; so lmrol . ,t·.'ld 
'to human rationality as Jaspers believes, it is difficult to s.:;c 
hoF anythin~; at all can be meaningfully said about i·::-. Jaspers in 
fact concodes this. "The ulti:na te in thinldnz, e.s in communicc.t~!..or.., 11 
h"' c-"''""' 11 l' r '"l'ln·r1C8 112 
-. ... -..' '-.lV•J' >.) J 0 U V .-. But it does not thorc;fore follo·:-:, o.t least 
symbols. It is to this notion that 110 must nmr tuY.'n. 
10. The RolG of S;:r-:1bols 
i. The iJood fo:::- 3y;nbo1s 
Jasp(::Jrs' mota physics, is in need of clarL'icc:ction. 
he us0s, Chiffre, literally n1eans 11ciph8l~, 11 or code. Often, ho·wver, 
it is translated simply o.s "symbol, 11 ;r:1ic'·' L; t~•r, designation l-W 
11 l-letaphor II .J..nd 11m;yth II are Otl1::il' tcrl'ilS CJhiC{1 arn USc.:;d 
virtually synonymously. T Jha tover pri va to connotations th3::> c--; ~rords 
may have in l1zlisl.1 usat;c, Jaspers employs t}1:::;r1 ~:.Lnost intcrc:1.::mge-
c..bl~r. 
question is at least partially implicit in ·.rlnt has alr2ady b::;sn s2.id 
1 J:c.spers, Reason and -.:2dst0nz, pp. lOLI·-106. 
2Ibid., p. 106. 
ul1ich he envisions. Philosop:w is the soo.rc~1 ~or B:;in;, but upon 
reflection it bocomos clear that B8inG D.S SUC~1 is 
---
us. According to Jaspcn~s, Trs realize that Being is i~1 fact bii'ur-
~I?l.icil 1:e arc not. That this division in Being is not o.bsoluto is 
ovic~snt from the notion of the Sncompassin;, as \Je :!:1a'Jc~ seen. By 
~11ea11s of this concept, Jaspors is able to partially ov::;rco:n::; the 
Tl1i::; 11 0L1':Jr, 11 again, is not a nonolitl1ic unity, "-.'o.c it is 
constituted by God and the 'JOrld, neither oi.' 'I:1ich is :crJducibl~; to 
itself; it is not self -::c::istent, but o. mcdiun or 1.r::licL' :·o :· th:; 
distinction. Transcend::mcr::: is utterly re;~r10vod frou 111211, Jet in t':1e 
mor.1cnt of =xistsnz .=<.eality is tempol~arily illm;1inatod. .\t t~1o point 
Hhero :1o attains his true selfhood, ma..Yl also attains his profound:cst 
o:Hareness of a Transcendent Deity. 
But this 11 aT:Ja:ceness 11 is not u.nmediatc3d: Transcendc3ncc is never 
disclos0d as it is in itself. T!1rougl1 tho ~nconpassing ~Jhich bot':J. 
subj3ct a:;1d Transcendent object s~1are in, the clivision in Being is 
kept from h-:dng absolute. But it is not t:":Jr3~0r(3 :my less l'Cal. 
Thus the n:;ed for symbols, uhic:1 &.lono a'.'O able; to conv:;J smnetiling 
of the reality o:: Transcendence. A commentator has c::urcss2d this 
1 C-"' e cr 
.L., •b• Ibid., pp. 59-60 • 
state of affairs in tho follo~·ring way: 
\l'nen ••• in our encounter Hi th tho ~ror ld of phenon,::Jno., T,JG are 
able to encounter the transcendent ground of all its modes 
of being, He becom8 conscious of tne fact that the objects 
of empirical existence are not th2 ultimate ends of knoH-
ledge but are the bearers of me2ning that transcend their 
empirical dimensions, and that the sol: ts grounded in 
that which transcends its finite limits. (italics mine) 
The empirical vrorld, Jaspers seems to be saying, is akin to 
appearance, to an ephemeral sort of reality. These appearances are 
significant in that they convey something of the Reality irJhich lies 
behind and beyond them. They in fact make it possible for us as 
existents to understand that >·<e ourselves are more than appearances; 
VIe are nou.'llenal, not merely phenomenal. 
ii. The Nature of Symbols 
The function of symbols is now clear. They s:;rvc as v2:1iclos 
for the Being of Transc?ndence, which ~-Je approlv:md in and througl1 
them. They are not, 2.s vehicles, strictly speaking "objoctiv~a." 
They are, that is to say, private and not public, or, as Jaspers 
expresses it, their objectivity is permeated by subjectivity. The 
point of emphasis, hoVIever, lies in that process Hhereby they become 
privately meaningful. This process, or transformation, culminates 
in the "suspension" of a given object's objectivity. No longer is it 
simply an object as such, clearly delimitable and describable. It has 
become, for me, something lvhich was for it ;Jreviously only a poss-
ibility. The true form of thG symbol is disclosed •·rhen t:1e restrictive 
1Karl Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, trans. Jean 'I'. ·.Tilde, .1illiam 
Kimmel, and 'dilliam IG.u'6'a"Cl{(Jm.J York: Tvrayno Publish2rs, 1959), 
Translators 1 Introduction, p. 11. This vJOrk is a translation o::: t:1e 
last major section of Von der Ti.Jahrhei t. ?or the sake of convenience, 
it vrill be used in place of that section of ',Jahrhoit -;-Jherever possible. 
'". '"''· ,! 
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matter has been cleared away. But thJ.. s m"tap"'o" J.. s s ' t · 
• b il ~ omewna lnap-
propriate, for the transformation of objectivity takes place only in 
the act of transcending, •:-v-herein I achieve my true ]x:istenz. 1 !l._nd 
this experience cannot, apparently, be striven to\l]"ards quit::; in the 
Hay in •vhich a sculptor T1mrks toHard the completion of a statua. :'ud 
yet Jaspers' language seems almost to suggest the same sort of creative 
process. He speaks of the "hidden" symbols coming to life and being 
"freed" from their objectivity in the moment of transcendence. 
The symbols thus "freed 11 do not, hm·rever, become unambiguously 
meaningful. They remain opaque, obscure, Hith relation to the Trans-
cendence 1-rhich they partially convey. They have no ".fixed 11 meaning. 
lmd yet they are communicative; they do constitute a "language. 11 
;\mong their other characteristics Jaspers mentions their reality 
(~virklichkeit) and tneir in~inity, an indication that they are not 
simply to be taken as "signs. 11 Tho essence of the symbols cannot be 
captured in 2-ny single thought or experience, They defy analysis, 
for their reality is rooted in that 1-Jhici1 transcends the :;;':lpirical. 2 
But ""rhat is a symbol? Or, rather, t.Jhat can be a symbol? 
Jaspers answers this question in a curious fashion. Everything, he 
tells us, is potentially a symbol of Being: 
Es e;ibt nichts, was nicht Chiffre soin k8nnte. Alles 
Dasein hat ein unbestimmtes Schweie;en und Sprcc:·"c:L, 
.·_;eheint cJbl]"aS auszuddicken, aber fraglich, Hoftir und 
Hovan. Die rrJelt, ob Natur oder Hensch, ob Sternenrau.m 
odor Geschichte, das BeHUsztsein tiberhaupt sind nici1t 
1 Ibid., p. 39. 
2 I· ·d ~·· pp. 39-40. 
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nur da. :Ulos Daseinende ist gleichsa.m physiognomisc;1 
anzuschaucm. 1 
T~1i0 list is practically exhaustiv,:;: tiw crorld, nature, man, 
history---all or any o.f these may becomo symbols; their sil·:mce, 
if c;ilence it bs, may be turned into spe3ch. ,\11 of t~12se p:1:momena 
may take on a nou:nenal quality in the transcend:mt experience, ·:v:::Jn 
thoug:1t and intuition are capable of such radical transformation. 
Jaspers in fact feels that the history of philosophy arnni::·ably 
exemplifies the "transfiguration of reality" i;Jhich i1as occurred in 
the thinking of the great philosophers of all agos. 2 The history of 
art J1igl1t be equally exemplary) 
iii. 11 7Loading 11 the Syr.1bols: The Possibility of D:::csption 
It is only in the act of individual trans csnding, ~J e have 
said, that the sy;.nbols become meaningful, or t:1at any symbols become 
mea:'1ingful. To the extent that one is a ,2articipant in the reality 
of t'clo symbols, to the extent that they "grasp" him, to that extent 
do they convey to him V1:1 t vJhic h they symboliZ\3, i.e. Trans cendonce. 4 
This participation is more than rational, for reason alone cannot 
come to grips -vJi th the symbols. They demand i'ai th ( Glaubo) : 
Ic:1 kann so wenig einen Glauben objektiv,:; ausspr:cc:wn, 
1-rie ich versprechen kann, uas nur sein c·'ird, uenn al~> 
Freihoit der G.:dstenz konm1t. 5 
1Jaspers, ~'1il., p. 168. 
2Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, pp. 51-53. 
Jcf. Jaspsrs, Phil., pp. 168-199. 
4Ibid., p. 153. Also, '.Jal1rheit, p. 489. Cf. Paul Tillich 1 s 
essay, nTho Nature of .2.eli::.;ious Language,n in Theology of Culture, pp. 53-67. 
5rbid., p. 156. 
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The symbols are thus rationally inexplicable. But does tr1is 
not open the door for delusions and deceptions of r:;very kind? Jaspers 
ad.'lli ts tl1a t it does, and tries to come to grips ui ti1 t:w pro ble1~1 
involved. l3ut :1.e only expl.ains that to r,3cor;nizo a delusion is to 
cease being deluded. That is, if "'.-Je fals:Jly suppos,:; ourc;elvos to 
have appre:1.ended B2ing itself in a particula:c symbol, \·Je ar(; chluded. 
~·>le also go astray either in making symbols "real existents" in the 
vJOrld, or else merely aesth8tic phenmnena. Apparently the only c.Jay 
to avoid this kind of deception is to be on ;;uard against it; to 
realhe that in the symbols He do not in fact :1ave hold of 3eing. 1 
':le need to realize ths "transparency" of t}w s;y;:nbols, for in :5iving 
them a determinate character ·vrc make them lose uhatever transcendent 
quality they may have had. Their strsn::;th lies in theil· siLmcc,:;. 2 
The ::;oal of philoso}Jhizing, • . re havo suggested throug:1out, is 
for Jasp2rs insep:1rabl;:,r connected to the sea:.~ch fo~· trus Sc;inc, 
Being of Tr anscondonce. .Ciovr t~1is goal is to be 2.t taincd, if at all, 
is noH evident. Tho "hi:.:;hest stac;e 11 in ~)~iloscphizing is only roached 
•,vll.en sv·arything '-Thich is potentially a symbol ha;> in :rcali ty beCODD 
a symbol. This ideal stato may generally be; conside;,~ed beyond human 
attainnlGnt, though for mystics this is apparently not ths cas·:::. It 
is attained Hhen I 2r.1 one 11lJith all stages J.nd modes of objectivity 
and subj8ctivit;r ••• I am a•,rare of B.'Jing by :1ot h.:win::; becomo bound or 
1 Cf. Jaspers, '.1ahrhoit, ?P· 48?-488. 
2Ibid., '?· 489. 
dd ' 1("'1" 0) groun e an;¥"\·Inero. l "CtLlcs ml:'le 
Aystical 3Xperience aside, 2 ho;-ravcr, t~e "ascent" to a full 
consciousness of Being is possible only in staces, tie earlier 
levels of attainment h0in6 "preserved and e12VJ.tad 11 (aufgeb.oben) 
during the ascent. Thus it is possible for :11c to din.1Gctici1.lly 
risn to tlw ~1ighest l0vel of ~/:lici1 I a.:n ca~XlbL;. The; ;csccmt is not 
lo:;ica.l, nor evcm cnronoloo·ica.l. It is existcmtial, usin;:; t':te :rord 
1v;r:::; in its bl'Oachst scmse. Ll sayin::; that t:1is goal of ~i1ilo-
sophizin;::; is not rest~·icted by extra-personal facto~:-s, JL1s:le~·s 
apparently doc;s not ':rish to exclude the possibility of aid :·rocn any 
and every source. Zven scientific investi2::1tion, ~re are told, can 
bo an o.;:;ent of illumination, although noeJ t:lis is possible is not 
disclosed. 3 ~·lnat Jaspers undoubtedly means h; that even :2_.: t[w 
process of scientific discovery Jo can discern a deeper reality than 
:.·rhat is immediately presc:mt. Science can be an aid to faiU:; it 
need not be a hindr:mce. 
iv. The Ascent to God and b.e Possibility of ~<'oundering 
Is it e;enuincly possible for an individual to ap9ro'1c:~ t[1G 
reality o£' Transcrmdcmcc;? Is God Hi thin rc)ac:1? Or must -:;vcloy 
,1ttempt to reach the Deity ultimat'.;ly .Lail? Jcoslc::rs deals :·:me.~t'::dly 
'lrit11 those crucial questions, a.nd much o:;:~ tho next b·IO c;1aptc~·s crill 
1Jasoers, Truth and Syri~ol, p. 66. Cf., c.r:;., ·7.aymond B. 
Blakney (od.), Hei~~~C'khart ~.;ovJ York: ?al'~x:r Torci1books, 1957), 
pD. 129-132, 170-173. Also, Ploti:'lus, ::illnc"ads, tr(lns. Stop~1en 
H~cKenna (Ne.-J York: Pant:1oon, 11. d. ) , Fifth ~nnsad, ~ic;ht~1 Tractate, 
pp. 424-425 and DassL~. 
2soe belo1·r for a I~1ore a1~tended o~-:arninatio.n o_~ Jasp.3rs' vic~·J 
of mystical union. 
JJaspers, Truth and S;rmbol, p. 70. 
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be concerned to examine his answers. Here we need only to mention 
the dangers which Jaspers envisions as besetting this perilous 
quest. That there are such dangers is evident from the very nature 
of the symbols, for these are the only means by which we can apprehend 
Transcendence at all. If we go astray in following them, we have lost 
the road altogether, for there is no other way. Jaspers uses several 
met?-phors in describing how men ''lose" the reality of Transcendence. 
He speaks of being "stranded," of "missing the way," or 11foundering" 
(scheitern). Scheitern is often translated simply as 11ship-v;rreck, 11 
and this idiomatic translation is probably most adequate to Jaspers' 
meaning. He is saying, by means of these metaphors, that one can never 
be certain of having reached God, and that it is similarly impossible 
safely to ignore God. These two poles are the Scylla and Charybdis 
between which man steers his ship, hoping against hope to avoid being 
v;rrecked. At either extreme lies demonism, the worship of a false God, 
1 
whether it be the world as such or else our own distorted image of God. 
The notion of "shipwreck" is of course itself a symbol, 
pointing as it does to what Jaspers considers the ultimate question 
facing man. To founder is to fail in the search for Being, the 
metaphysical quest. And yet to fail is not to give ~ the quest, 
for a 11will to continue112 drives man to renevr the unending search. 
1cf., e.g., Jaspers, Scope, pp. 126 ff. 
2Jaspers, Phil., III, pp. 222 ff. Thyssen, in his article 
"The Concept of Fo~ring" in the Schilpp volume, feels that it is 
the active exrerience of foundering, rather than merely its symbolic 
meaning, that Jaspers is stressing. 
40 
man gains his cleo.rcst m·rarol1c;ss of God. It is o. )J3.l'ado~:, to bo 
but for Jaspers this pa.cadox is qui to neanin;;ful. 
takin.:; t~is loap He engage J.n the ultimata act of transcsndcnco. 
anx:iety," a stop vrhic:1 is .for man tho most d~f.ficult o.f all. 1 In 
In foundering He see tho possibility o;.~ a "le<.tp out o.::· 
~V:.'lat is t:1.is leap? I do not think it erroneous to corrolato it -:dth 
Hhat JasJ.x:rs calls "philosophical f·aith. ~ T:1is supposition, ho:rever, 
needs justification. 
11. Philosophical .?ait~1 
sophical fait!1, 
11 
although the tc;rm 11fai th 11 in t11.is conto;:t is quitr:J 
Jaspers has dc;voted an entire book to the; subject of "p~1ilo-
broad and in need of clarii:'ication. T£12 uo1~d t~scd is G·l;;.ub), c/1ic:1 
term is too closely related to mere "credibility" to bo of c>ervicc 
may also be translated, loss adequatsly, as 11boli:,f. 11 T1e latto:::' 
1
lhat kind of .filith is Jaspers talkinc about? :\.nd crhat is the 
f 
. F' t ~ . th . t . t lf . t' .j.l • l . ~ 2 or J.n ~ac , laJ. COllll11Ul1J.ca os J. so J.n rw u1J.rhang or r-::asoc1. 
here. But faith is not to be thought of as divorced from r~tion~lity, 
rwcossi ty for faith? 
Tnose questions should have bcsn pa1'ti2.lly ans:Jel'ed in our 
discussion of the naturo o.f :~xistenz, the stato oZ illu..>nination :Thic:1 
1Ibid., pp. 235-236. 
2Jaspors, 11::\.eply to l'!y Critics, 11 in Schilpp, Jasne.cs, p. 7?7. 
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is tho goal of hu.'1lan exp.Jrience. t~_s .:·ooted in tl:1e :-illcompassin::;, this 
exp,orionce is the original contc;xt for faith. ,\t the same time, it 
should bo noted, it is also a description oi faith. ::<'aith, then, 
arises not merely frmn a recognition of hu'·?J.an limitatiorcs (o.[;. t.lw 
limited sphere:; of intellect) but from a roal:L~ a tion t':1at t:, :; ro 'llm 
no non -~·ri tl1 th.n universe. 
T:v:; need for faith is evident fro:n tl:c fact o:' t':l:; cl:cava:::;) 
from both tho ~JOrld and God. The actual oz~,rci s.; of fai tl1 bc'Jcomos 
necessa~·y 1-rhen it is realized that symbols alone are able to conv0y 
to us anythinc; of tb.e Bcin3 of Transcendence. .So J ctspers sp:Jaks of 
"believing in the sy:'llbols, 112 by 1-rhich he means believin~~ in everything 
'irhich becomes a symbol for us in the experience of Tr:m.sconding. The 
object. of fai t:1 is apparently of littlo concern., and Jaspers avoids 
roforring fait:1 to an object, as is ordin2.rily dono in the: case of 
the cognitive faculty. Ti1ought alc-.rays ro:L\:;rs, '.·:c; say, and so rmst 
belief. Jaspers, ~a~·: ever eschcn·rs tl1e language of "ref·~~-~ence:_:. " FJ.i tl1 
cannot be ;siven "objective expr3ssion. n3 T::lis do s not r:'ean, of' 
course, that fait.:1 is irrational, but simply t~vJ.t it is o.n :;:cpr3ssion 
of individuality, aYld n s such cannot be presc2:'iptiv:~ for anyon:.: else. 
It is a free affirmation of subjectivity, and mu~>t al;·:ays 3u::crd a,:;ainst 
1Jaspers, Scope, p. 9. 
2Phil., III, pp. 155 f~. 
Jibid.' o 1 S6 
.i • _,/ • 
considorin::; itself capablG of bein0 made a "unive~·sall;y v:1lid ::;tat:'-
"len-'- 111 l! v. 
Ho'ii is faith expressed? Concretely, in terms oi actual 
behavior and existential communication, that is in t2o -vrorld of 
persons. ?ai th that is not significa...11t for behavior, J as pure; feels, 
is not faith at all. In 'Jahrheit; he dev:-;lops the concept of lovG 
as a I:'.anifestation of the higl1est kind of c01mnunication bc~broon 
individuals, and as a characteristic of our attitude tolrards Tr,ms-
2 
condence as "\·Jell. This notion is conspicuously absent from virtually 
all of Jaspers 1 other uorks, ho\rovor, a fact ~Jhic:~l ~.;ould s·o c~m to be 
ovid::mce of his gcmero.l noc;lisence of ethics as a philoso-phical con-
cern. 
.fronositionally, it is also possible to :;ivc :;xm·;~;cion to 
faith. The necr-='ssity of suc:.-1 propositions al·iscs .rhen, :dth Kant, 
He ask the fundamental questions of our existenc:;, such as w:nat do 
') 
I knoH?", "'>Jhat is truth?", and "'.)hat is authontic?"..J 
These questions so beyond the limits of the knmvable, and 
even beyond t:1e: uorld as a. uholo. They can only be ans,mrod in 
terms of the sncompassing. Certain specific propositions, ho:wvor, 
can be set forti1, amon::; -o:·J~1ich Jaspers includJs: 
1 Cf. Jaspers, :Jay, p. 11. This t~wme recurs o.::;ain and a::;ain 
in Jaspers 1 ~-rri tings on t.:1e relation of p~lilosophy to religion. .'\ 
later cha?ter will contrast philosophical o.nd religious faith. 
3Jaspers, Sco~e, pp. )0, :r. 
God is. 
There is an absolute imperative. 
Tho :.wrld is an ,ephemeral stage bet:TCnn God and c;=:i:;tencc. 1 
T:1e _first and t{tird o_': these ~:)ropositions :1avo 'llready b:::en dealt 
uit~1 to somo extent. Tl1e "o.bsolut::; irrJ.~)srativc 11 s:•oken or in t~L: 
socond ~)ro;)osition doos not refer first of all to r:10rs.l obli::;o.tion, 
? 
tonce. "'-- It is the "fountain of action 11 CThic~l ou:_;i1t to zuid::: 2ll o::.~ 
our behavior. 
L\11 of t~1ese propositions are indemonstrable, and t~1US ar::; 
constituents of faith. They can be given no clear and 1.ma.rnbit;uous 
stat•3ment, and are constantly challenged by ti1e counter-assertions 
of 11-u."lfaith. 11 ?aith is, in t~1e last analysis, a very uncertain 
'2 
posSc)SSion. Jaspers can say: "I do not kno·J 1-rl:wtl1er I believe. IIJ 
To surrender faith in God, man and the ~,;-orld is, in Jaspers 1 
vieH, to yield to nihilism. To turn from B~ing is to embrace) non-
Being, tho demonic opposite of all that is cmthontic and real. L!-
But faith in God is primary, a sJ.nD ~'3:. non for botl1 lovn oi' ma11 
and proper love o': tl1c Horld. 
1 Ibid., p. JO. 
2Jaspers, ~-by, p. 55. 
3Ja~p-er·~, P',-il III p 15o~" ~ ~ ~ -··--'--· ' ' - . . 
4cr., e.g., Ka1~1 Jaspers, The Ori,;i12, and :Joal oF' :~istory, trans. 
Hicha8l Bullock Cre~-r ;)av;:m: Yale, 1953), pp. 215 ff. 
12. 3"~..L;nna:cy and J.0capitulation 
broad and necessarily incmnplete ~·Jay, tlw :,w.in ~Joint:> of JaJmors r 
metaphysical philosophy. It l1as naturally bccm :iJ~1possiblc to give a 
complote presentation of thr:;y system as a close-
knittedness of Jaspers' thinkint:; ouc;ht to ' , ' nave ooen apparon~. It 
has bcsn impossible, because of the close inter-r2lationship of the 
d:>cmed essential to his undcrstandins of t:1e conce;~Jt of ·:rod. \ 
brief su.rmnary o.~ t[1os:; 2-spects mo.y nou h2 :.:;iv-::n, in ~)r:.:;p:u'o.tion for 
tl1e more restricted discussion to follmr in the noxt tro chapters. 
·.re bcc;an by ~)ointin; out Hhat Jaspol'S tales to be t:1:: n :c:;ssary 
startinc; poi:!t of all p~1ilosophizin[;, viz. t~18 ;-:UJ!W.ll situ::-,tion a::; 2. 
lrJhole, uith its attenda;1t questions and p:toble1110, P:1ilosopiw does 
not b2gin in a vacu.wn, but i:'1 historical situations :r:lich :3ive rise 
to ti:w fund2.1110ntal questions of existence. Its lJU.rposo, mot'CJovor, 
is to ::;ive meaning to imra.an life, by assisting ;~'1Dl1 in the cndlHsS 
quo:st for true B2inz;, t·.:s source and goal of hurw.n life. 
Jaspers' :p11ilosop}J.Y is not, hm.-Jever, an ontological systa:n, 
at least if u.c; a1·e to 1.ccept Jaspers' mm t3sti:nony. An ontoloeiy 
is impos::;ible b3cause of tie nature of the kno~Ti11g process and, evcm 
more radically, because of the cleavo.ge in :..·oali ty itself. Tims 
Jaspe::.·s int!.·oduccs the concept o.£' t!1e .~ncompassin,~~, H:1ic:: :1e uses 
to expL!.in t~1o.t the bifurcation in Being need not (indeed, ou.zht 
not) to be conceived of as ultimate. Th0 tension in Being remains., 
but not as an ultimate dualism. 
As subjocti ve, the mcompassing has several distinct modc_:s : 
empirical ozistonce, consciousness as suc;1, or intellect, s~Ji~,it (or 
mind), and, fin2.lly, :Sxistenz. T!1is last mode of t~1o :::ncocnpassinc; 
sw~1s up all oi the others, Qlld brines t£wm to tL1eL~ fullest c_:mploy-
ment. ~~xist8nz is tl1o almost indescribabl:::; stE>.tc) uhic[l c~1aract~;:cizGs 
tl1o individual at the mo;:nent of his tr·uo sdf:1ood. It is the suprene 
goal o.f philosopny, for in attaininc; it man simultaneously attains 
both his true selfhood and his greatest certainty of Transcendence. 
Transc;:mdence, vro noted, is the "othsr 11 uhich is opposite not 
only to ourselves, but to the Horld as crell. T:Cw ~JOrld iE; not :Xod. 
1\nd yet the ~rorld is the ar0ma of h1L'11an activity, and must not b::; 
l~ojected. 
ileither is l~cason to be dispenssd ;rit'1. J G.s pars lS no 
irrationalist: reason, he; recognizos, l." •J 
phizin;; is carried on. Truth, sinilarly, is no s.b:.ot:cact o~'1Gity, 
but a quality of our behavior as ~~ationo.l and moral hum::tn beings. 
',{e sau, finally, the important role ·vrhic~1 t11e notion of" S;)Tl.nbol 
pl2.ys in Jaspers' philosophy. Definablo only ostensively, symbols 
a:ce the metaphysical vor1iclos uhich convoy to us something of realit;:,r 
;ausive and evo.n:cscont, symbols are a function of our mm 
individual pro:;ress toHa:cd that !jOal for v:liCll all !.l2n strive. 
They si,:,nify tho speech o:~· Tr,:mscendenco, but this speoc:1 is both 
muted 2.:>1d ambi[:;uous. 
tl1e symbols :nust ul tirn2.tsly fail us. But in "foundorinz" l'lem di;:;-
pos.siolo t:v:: continued quast for t:ac Bein::; ".T~lic}l is our source :J.Yld c;oal. 
~re h~w2 ;yet to sea ';hcthel~ the concept of Sod h::; has develo~led is "m 
adequats one. Little has thus far been said of the rslatio:1 of 
J:1s~JCl'S 1 notion of Transcendence to the more tl~aditional ca·i>:?:~o~~ir;s 
revelation. 
been anticipated in the foregoing section, bu.t that ccrs.s unavoidable 
if !::is system Has to be s2cn in its full scope. ~re must no'v HXJ.mine 
t!1em in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GOD OF TRANSCENDENCE 
1. Prolegomena: The Difficulties Stated 
We have seen in the previous chapter that Jaspers' philosophy 
is a closely knit structure, no one part of which can be wholly neg-
lected without distorting some other part. While Kierkegaard eschewed 
systematization, Jaspers does not. Despite this, however, his meta-
physical philosophy remains ambiguously open-ended, and admits of 
no easy categorization. It purports ~ to be an ontology, yet 
contains all of the elements of an ontological structure, and it 
certainly employs ontological language. These inconsistencies seem 
incapable of resolution, at least within Jaspers' metaphysical frame-
work. He recognizes this himself, and asks that we merely try to 
derive insights from his philosophy instead of trying to correct its 
apparent contradictions and ambiguities. 1 
The fact remains, however, that Jaspers has attempted to con-
struct what might be called a natural theology, and has done so 
partially on the basis of a critique of theism. It remains to be seen 
whether his critique, indeed his understanding, of theism is justifia-
ble, and whether his own reformulation of the question of God is ade-
quate. 
1cf. Jaspers, "Reply", in Schilpp, Jaspers, pp. 840 ff. 
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It should be recognized, at this point, that it is not al-
together fair to Jaspers' intention to consider his treatment of God as 
one aspect of his metaphysics. This is why the background material of 
Chapter II has been necessary. As already suggested, it is not justi-
fiable simply to identify the term "God" with Jaspers 1 term Transcend-
ence. Jaspers stresses that "God" is but a ~for Transcendence 
(or Being Itself), utilized because we wish to refer to the latter in 
a certain way. Certain other names---such as "the One", "the Godhead", 
and "the Deity"---might do just as well. Jaspers uses these terms 
virtually interchangeably. With the recognition that he means all of 
them to refer to Transcendence, however, we shall, for the sake of 
clarity, use the term "God" almost exclusively in the following 
nal . 1 a ys~s. 
Our first task will be to consider Jaspers' evaluation of the 
traditional approach to the question of God's existence. This will be 
followed by an examination of his view of the nature of God, as seen 
in the light of two prominent examples of religious experience. The 
chapter will conclude with a survey of Jaspers' consideration of the 
problem of evil. 
2. The Question of God's Existence 
The problem of the existence of God is one which has occupied 
a central place in Western philosophy. Since Kant this question has 
1The necessity for this qualification becomes clear when it 
is realized that even the ascription of a ~ to Transcendence de-
limits it in some way. The extent to which Jaspers repudiates all 
objectification of Transcendence will become clear below. 
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had a radically different cast than previously, and the Scholastic 
"proofs" have been discredited in all but Thomistic circles. As a 
partial consequence, many recent philosophers have not taken this 
question seriously, and have either assumed God's existence or have 
inferred that modern science leaves no room for God. 
Jaspers, for one, is concerned that so few contemporary philoso-
phers will openly commit themselves on this issue. He insists that 
skepticism cannot honestly be tacit, but must clearly enunciate its 
metaphysical presuppositions. To avoid the basic metaphysical questions 
on the pretense that 11i t is best not to talk of what we do not know" 
is, in Jaspers' view, to abandon philosophy. 1 
Broadly speaking there have been two main approaches, in 
Western thought, to the enigmatic question of God's existence. These 
are the ontological approach, on the one hand, and the cosmological on 
the other. 2 The former approach has usually been taken by rationalistic 
thinkers and the latter by empiricists, although this difference has 
never been absolute. The important distinction is between starting 
points: the ontological argument, in its various forms, always begins 
with human reason; the cosmological argument begins with the world of 
experience. 
Jaspers gives brief consideration to both of these methods of 
argumentation, but affirms from the start that they cannot succeed in 
what they set out to do. The cosmological argument, first of all, is 
1Jaspers, Way, p. 41. Cf. his discussion of positivism and 
its shortcomings in~., I, pp. 212-222. 
2cf. Tillich' s illuminating essay, "The Two Types of Philoso-
PhY of Religion", in Theology 2!. Culture, pp. 10-29. 
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·taken to be invalid because '~e cannot, from the existence of the world 
as a whole, infer the existence of something other than the world."1 
The world ~ ~ whole is not and cannot be confronted by consciousness. 
The cosmological argument fails to take this into account. It is not 
entirely worthless, however. If it is regarded not as a proof, but as a 
kind of metaphorical inference, then 11it expresses awareness of the 
mystery inherent in the existence of the world and of ourselves in it. 112 
Explained this way, the argument makes no clear distinction at all be-
tween God and the world. The ''mystery" Jaspers here has in mind is 
doubtless the Encompassing, whose unity includes ~God and the world, 
yet without allowing either to be reduced to the other. 
Jaspers considers the ontological argument in similarly brief 
fashion. Following Kant, he points out that "existence" is not a predi-
cate, and that no argument from thought to reality can be valid) He 
states his conclusions about the ontological approach in the following 
way: 
Die For.men des ontologischen Beweises gehen auf Tranzendenz 
schledthin. Sie fassen nichts Einzelnes ins Auge, sondern 
gehen von meinem Seinsbewusztsein im Dasein aus. Ich selbst 
als Denkender werde mir in ih n en zur Chiffre. Aber errtnl t 
wird diese Chiffre erst durch das, was ich in einem bin und 
sehe und glaube. Aile besonderen Gottesbeweise sind darum 
Anwendungen des ontologischen, indem sie von einem bestimmten 
Sein ausgehen, das als existentiell ergri4fenes Sein einem 
spezifischen Aufschwung charackterisiert. 
1Jaspers, Way, p. 43. 
is to be found in Phil., III, 
The fullest discussion of these arguments 
pp. 201-204. 
2Ibid. 
3Jaspers, Phil., III, pp. 202-203. For Kant's treatment of the 
proofs, see Critique 2!~ Reason, pp. 495-531 (A584-642, B612-670). 
4rbid., p. 203. Cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, pp. 204-210. 
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Thus the ontological argument directs us toward Transcendence, 
or God, but it does so only in so far as it assumes the status of a 
symbol. This in fact is the only merit of !& of the arguments, in-
eluding the moral argument of Kant. To the extent that they make us 
aware of the Being of God they are valuable. But their weakness is 
immediately obvious also, Jaspers asserts, in that they make possible 
the most radical doubt. The proponents of such arguments neglect the 
11givenness 11 of God's Being, a givenness of which one becomes fully 
aware only in faith-inspired acts. 
Gegen meinem Zweifel gibt es kein Widerlegung, sondern ~ 
~. Die Tranzendenz wird nicht beweisen, sondern von ihr 
wird gezeugt. Die Chiffre, in der sie mir ist, wird nicht 
wirklich ohne mein Tun • • • Die Tranzendenz wird so dem 
philosophischen Selbstsein in der Welt nicht ohne Freiheit 
gegenwHrtig. Die Tranzendenz des Philosophierenden Menschen 
wird so wenig bewiese~ wie der Gott der Religion, der im 
Kultus gefunden wird. 
The kind of act or deed (~) Jaspers here has in mind is cer-
tainly a moral one. In an important sense he is adhering to the Kantian 
dictum that for practical reason God is certain, however impalpably 
elusive he may be for theoretical reason. 
Kierkegaard, in reviewing the arguments for God's existence, ar-
rives at a somewhat different conclusion regarding the implications of 
their failure to demonstrate God. It may be instructive to note briefly 
what this conclusion is, in contrast to that of Jaspers. It will serve 
to clarify the differences between these two thinkers, in relation to 
the problem of historical revelation, if we can understand why they are 
1~., pp. 20)-204 
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driven to such opposite conclusions at this crucial point. 1 
). Kierkegaard on the Arguments for God 
Kierkegaard, admittedly, was not primarily interested in the 
question of God's existence. The reality of God was the premise which 
underlay all of his religious and non-religious writings. What~ of 
paramount concern to him was man's relationship to God, and the grounds 
upon which an eternal relationship of this sort could conceivably be 
based. How to find "eternal happiness"---this was his obsession, es-
pecially as articulated in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It 
is certain, however, that Kierkegaard did not shrink from the diffi-
culties facing human reason in regard to this quest. He had no fear 
of giving reason its full due, for he knew that only in recognition 
of his ultimate intellectual helplessness would man turn to God for 
enlightenment and salvation. 
The Kierkegaardian approach, as evidenced in the Philosophical 
Fragments, evidences a considerabl~ familiarity with the speculative 
philosophical tradition from Plato to Hegel. 2 With Jaspers, Kierkegaard 
follows Kant in rejecting a hallmark of that tradition---the ontological 
argument for God's existence. Kierkegaard' s reasoning is quite explicit: 
If 
• • 
• I always reason ~ existence, not toward existence, whether I 
move in the sphere of palpable sensible fact or in the realm of 
1The basic difference, as will become clear, is that Kierkegaard 
insists on the ~ for revelation. Jaspers recognizes no such need, 
for every symbol reflects God. 
2s8ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. 
Swenson and rev, Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1962), pp. 46-59. Cf. Introduction by Niels Thulstrup, pp. 1xxxvii-1civ. 
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thought. 111 (italics mine) This is why the proofs are invalid. There is 
no "absolute relationship" between being and existence---at least for 
human beings. 2 
The cosmological argument, Kierkegaard asserts, is deficient 
because it fails to recognize that God must be presupposed in order for 
his "works" to become significant. The proof is, in short, an example 
of petitio principii. The basic limitation in both the cosmological 
and ontological arguments is that, however concealed, a ''leap" is 
necessary if the desired conclusion can legitimately be derived. In 
St. Thomas' "five ways", for example, one is asked to identify the 
''highest being" of the arguments with the God of Biblical revelation. 
No apparent justification is given for this identification. 
Kierkegaard insists that to identify the "Unknown" of reason 
with an a priori conception of God is unwarranted. Reason cannot 
"absolutely transcend itself". One of the following disjuncts must be 
accepted: either the "Unknown" is to remain a mere limiting concept, 
about which nothing significant can be said, or else reason may choose 
without compunction:& conception of God which it happens to prefer. 
In neither case is there a purely rational basis for choosing that 
particular option.3 
Kierkegaard and Jaspers agree at least to this extent, that they 
both grant reason's ability to conceive of an "other", but its utter in-
1Ibid., p. 50. 
2Ibid.' pp. 50-51 
3Ibid.' pp. 55, 56. 
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ability to determine or characterize it.1 Where they differ, however, is 
immediately evident. Kierkegaard escapes reason's predicament by 
pointing to the historical Biblical revelation as a self-disclosure 
of God. Jaspers, on the other hand, will not concede this answer to 
the problem. In effect, he chooses the alternative of having the ''Unknown" 
remain a limiting concept, amenable to whatever names or characterizations 
we may wish to apply to it. This is an oversimplification, however, for 
Jaspers ~ in fact apply certain attributes to God. Several of these 
will be dealt with below. He does so, however, with the proviso that 
they are only symbolic, and become meaningful only to one who is prepared 
to hear the message of Transcendence. We shall have reason to inquire 
whether this proviso in fact exempts Jaspers from the charge that he has 
claimed too much for reason, assuming as symbols what he was unwilling to 
grant outright. 
That Jaspers attempts to characterize God is clear. How it is 
that we may meaningf'ully speak of God is less certain. At the very least, 
however, he emphasizes that God is ''known" only in transcending experience, 
i.e. in Existenz. 2 This implies that any statements about God, if they 
are taken as objectively valid descriptions, are false. God is not an 
1Both Jaspers and Kierkegaard take seriously the critique of 
Feuerbach, in which the latter argues that all characterizations of God 
are but objectified characterizations of man himself. Cf. The Essence 
£!Christianity, trans. George Eliot {New York: Harper, 1957), 
pp. 197 ff. 
2cf. Lohff 1 s comment on this in Glaube ~Freiheit, p. 78 • 
... ,,,· 
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object for thought and cannot become such an object. HJis real only 
subjectively or i2.!:, subjectivity. What meaning, then, do our statements 
about God have, since, though persistently made, they cannot be inter-
preted as objectively meaningful? Jaspers' reply, as already anticipated, 
is that such statements are to be taken as symbols, and are not open to 
confirmation or disconfirmation. There ought not to be any arguments 
about the nature of God, for a given s,ymbol has meaning only subjectively, 
in and through one's personal Existenz. Outside of this context they 
apparently have no meaning whatever. 
Jaspers often asserts that we cannot know what God is, but simply 
!:lli!1 he is. The certainty of God is a central affirmation of philoso-
phical faith. In describing God, however, we use metaphors and analogies 
which can be granted no certainty at all. Being drawn from human exper-
ience, they are limited in terms of finite intelligence. All conceptions 
of God are finally nothing more than pictures, metaphors, and symbols. 
As we have suggested, Jaspers makes use of these symbols himself. We 
must now investigate some of the attributes with which he characterizes 
the God of Transcendence. 
4. The Unity of God 
The single most important characteristic Jaspers applies to the 
Transcendent Deity is unity. God is not merely "one, " but ~ One. 2 
1The personal pronoun ''he" will be used in reference to God, 
although Jaspers usually uses the impersonal 11i t. 11 The English language 
makes unfeasible a similar usage. 
2see, e.g.,~., III, pp. 123-125; Scope, pp. 79-81; 
Way, pp. 49-50. 
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He is the "Encompassing of Encompassing", the all-inclusive Unity to 
which all finite beings (as well as the being of the world) are re-
lated. The nature of this relation is yet to be explored, although 
it is doubtful that an unequivocal interpretation of Jaspers' thinking 
is possible at this point. 
While God is one, he is not numerically one. Jaspers intro-
duces this qualification to absolve himself of the charge that he 
affirms an absolute monism, as well as to allow the One and Many prob-
lem to remain genUinely problematic. His qualification, however, seems 
unconvincing, for he elsewhere insists that God cannot have an "other" 
opposed to him. 1 Perhaps the "otherness" is from a human perspective 
only. In any case Jaspers finally declares that rational thought can-
not reconcile these apparently inconsistent views of God; we cannot 
determine how God can be over against the world and at the same time 
one with it. 
Der Eine ist in siner Einheit rationaler Denkbarkeit 
unzugHnglich, wail, was immer wir denken, wir auch 
unterscheidend denken, also das Eine und das Andere, 
und sei dieses das Nichts. Der Eine ist darum die in 
keiner Denkbarkeit zu be~renzende und zu erschBpfende 
Chiffer der Tranzendenz. 
The unity of God, Jaspers feels, is not without its analogy in 
our own experience. On a lower level the logical unity of thought is 
symbolic of the divine One. Most profoundly, however, it is the experi-
ence of transcending which gives us the truest analogy to the One. In 
1cf. Jaspers, Wahrheit, pp. 690-691. 
2Ibid., p. 691 
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Existenz we catch a glimpse of the higher unity in which, to however 
small an extent, we are privileged to share. 1 
5. God and Personality 
Jaspers' conception of God, as we have been suggesting, is one 
which cannot be outlined without qualifications. Indeed, his theology 
is almost entirely negative; he tells us what God cannot be, but very 
little of what he is or may be. Terming God "formal Transcendence", 
the "true Encompassing", the 11Boundary11 (Grenze) is quite uninstructive 
as to what God actually is. Jaspers of course holds that it is im-
possible to know exactly what God is. But a negative statement about 
God implies §2.!!!! kind of knowledge, even if it is not balanced by a 
positive assertion. Jaspers' positive assertions, he constantly reiter-
ates, are only symbols. They are media through which God speaks to ~· 
But the symbol language through which God speaks is not definitives, 
not compelling, not unambiguous. Hence the possibility of misconstruing 
God. 
Is God personal? This question appears in several of Jaspers' 
writings on religion, both critical and constructive. It is a question 
which has crucial implications for his entire philosophy of religion, 
especially with regard to the problem of revelation. On this issue, as 
on so many others, Jaspers appears to take an unequivocal stand at one 
point, only to withdraw from that stand at another. 
His main emphasis, we may safely say, is that God is not 
"personal" in any essential way. As he really is, God is not personality. 
1cf. ~., III, pp. 118-120 ff. 
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If Jaspers were to be consistent at this point, he would have to say 
that, of God as he really is, we know nothing. Instead he affirms that 
God shows himself as personal, the medium of this disclosure being the 
symbols of Existenz. It is difficult to believe that Jaspers means 
all of his statements about God to be relevant only in this restricted 
and very infrequent context of experience. If we are to believe him, 
however, this is evidently the case. 
In Philosophie, Jaspers states unequivocally that the idea of 
God as personal is but a symbol to be aufgehoben: 
Zumal Gott als Pers8nlichkeit zu denken in seinem aus vollen-
deter Weisheit und ~Htekommenden Willen der plant und lenkt, 
ist fast unausweichlich. Aber auch dieses ist als Symbol ein 
verschwindendes Bild und im tranzendierenden Denken winer auf-
zuheben.l 
In his later, post-war works, however, Jaspers admits the legiti-
macy of conceiving God in this way---although with reservations. God 
~ have 11a personal aspect", he concedes, but this is a statement of 
faith which it is not the business of philosophy to investigate, and is 
incapable of confirmation or disconfirmation. 2 The concession Jaspers 
makes at this point is more apparent than real, because "statements of 
faith" are equivalent to symbolic statements, and have no general 
validity. 
Jaspers is quite aware, however, that God is commonly spoken 
of in personal, anthropomorphic terms. He is called "Creator", "Provi-
dence", "Father", etc. These terms, and others like them, may, in 
lfhi!., III, p. 66. 
2see 11Reply to My Critics" in Schilpp, Jaspers, p. 784. 
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Jaspers' view, be considered meaningful for the individuals using them, 
but they cannot be said to apply to God himself. They are subjectively, 
but not objectively, valid. 
Jaspers finds the historical origin of such anthropomorphic 
conceptions in ancient mythology1, and concedes that men have always 
personified their deities. He is unwilling to draw the conclusion of 
some2, however, that mythology is simply the product of primitive man's 
attempt to adjust to his world. Jaspers sees both primitive mythology3 
and organized religion as attempts on the part of man to come to grips 
with the Other which transcends him. 
Can this attempt ever be successful? Is it possible actually 
to encounter Transcendence in the context(fdirect, unmediated religious 
experience? Jaspers deals with these questions quite explicitly. It 
is to the problem of communication with God, and its implications for 
Jaspers' theology, that we must now turn. 
6. Communication with God: Prayer and Mystical Union 
One of the central problems associated with characterizing God 
as essentially impersonal (or non-personal) is that of communication. 
How is it possible to address a God about whom we can know as little as 
Jaspers would allow, and that little only opaquely? Does God in fact 
1~., III, pp. 132 ff. 
2see, for example, Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science ~ 
Religion {New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1954), for an anthropologist's 
view of primitive religion. 
3rhe word umyth", as Jaspers uses it, acquires some interesting 
associations. These will become clear below where the question of 
revelation will be considered. Here it is sufficient to remark that 
Jaspers often uses the term ''mythu as synonymous with symbol. 
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respond to human need? These questions have proved to be insuperable 
to many religious philosophers. Jaspers, as we might expect, does not 
confront all of them directly, although implicitly he does try to find 
a workable answer. 
His opinion on prayer is unmistakable: God cannot be communi-
cated with. 1 Transcendence speaks to~ through the symbols, but we 
cannot literally speak to God. It is obvious, however, that religious 
individuals 9£. address God as a person, for whatever purpose. Jaspers 
implies that their faith, while certainly real, is apparently mis-
guided. His objections to prayer rest on several grounds. Prayer 
involves, first of all, an unwarranted objectification of the Deity; 
and, in addition, prayer tends to be utilitarian---it often attempts 
to ~ God for selfish human ends. 
The first of these objections may, on Jaspers•premises at 
least, be valid. The second is plainly false, because in fact much 
prayer is ~ petition, but praise. Jaspers, in reply, asserts that 
silence in the presence of the mediating symbols of Transcendence is 
the most acceptable form of worship. 2 If this admonition had been 
consistently followed during the history of the Christian church, it 
is doubtful that much, if any, of the religious music we now possess 
would have been written---to say nothing of non-musical expressions of 
worship. 
Jaspers' model in regard to prayer, it is evident, is not 
Biblical religion, but mysticism. It is the silence of the mystic in 
1cf. Jaspers, ~., III, p. 127; Scope, pp. 81 ff. 
2Jaspers, ~., III, p. 127. 
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the face of the ineffable One he has in mind when he characterizes 
prayer as excessive verbosity. The ideal for Existenz is not con-
frontation with a 11Thou11 , but "abstract philosophical contemplation11 • 1 
The One remains essentially a "stranger" who acts only 11at a distance", 
to borrow a useful phrase. 
What, then, of mystical experience? Is this a genuine, unmedi-
ated encounter with God? Jaspers prefers to describe the ~stic 1 s 
state as one where a "total union of subject and object is attained ... 
It is a transcending of all objectness.2 Jaspers fails, at this point, 
to distinguish clearly between what might be called "nature ~sticism11 
and specifically "religious" ~sticism.3 It would appear that for him 
the ~stic has reached the pinnacle for which all speculative philos-
ophy strives, and has embraced, as totalities, ~ God and the world. 
Here the danger inherent in ~sticism becomes evident. The 
mystic, in order to ascend to the One, must leave the fragmented 
world of the senses behind, and in so doing he is "unfaithful" to the 
world. This "unfaithfulness" is necessary, however, if the experience 
of~ m..ystica is to be had. What Jaspers really objects to is a dis-
connection of ~stical experience from life as a whole, so that inter-
personal relationships are not visibly affected by it. MYstics may be 
1Jaspers, Scope, p. 82. 
2Jaspers, Way, pp. 33-34. On aesthetic experience as potentially 
mystical, see~., III, pp. 192 ff. 
3In particular, he says little about holiness as a characteristic 
of the Divine. Cf. Rudolf Otto 1 s classic exploration of this theme in 
.Ih.! ~ of ~ Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1958). 
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constructive, he feels, through their moral behavior, and may thus 
render their unique experience beneficial for others as well. If, on 
the other hand, they reject the world in ascetic withdrawal, their 
experience can be of minimal social value. Thus the "test" of 
mysticism's validity, according to Jaspers, is its ability to make 
a difference in the moral life. If mysticism is to have more than 
merely PsYChological significance it must produce what the New Testa-
ment calls "fruits of the Spirit". 1 
This, in fact, is the test which Jaspers applies to all claims 
of "special" religious experience. It is quite legitimate to ascribe 
the attributes of personality---will, command, love, etc.---to God if 
doing so enables one more effectively to communicate with one's fellow 
man. Jaspers tends to feel, however, that laying stress upon communi-
cation with God---in a unique and strictly private way---actually 
hinders communication between men, and more often than not degrades 
God. 2 Love for God ought not to be productive of divisions among men; 
it ought rather to produce, in the individual, love for "every man in 
the world". 3 
7. God as Creator 
We have seen that Jaspers characterizes God in essentially im-
personal terms, although he often uses the language of personification. 
1cf. Jaspers, Wahrheit, pp. 696-697. 
2Jaspers, Phil., III, p. 166 (see pp. 164-168). This is one 
of Jaspers' strongest ethical appeals • 
. )Ibid.' p. 167. 
Similarly, it appears, he conceives of God as essentially "inactive", 
while often speaking M ll God were active. By "activity", in this con-
text, I simply mean participation in the affairs of the world, recogni-
zing that this definition is excessively broad. 
"Classical" theism1 holds that God "knows" but does not include 
the world. This 11knowing11 usually involves the notion of creation, al-
though it may (as with Augustinian theism) involve considerably more 
than this. It is difficult to see how Jaspers, on Hartshorne's scheme, 
can be termed a classical theist, despite his admiration of andaffini-
ties for this tradition. 
In regard to creation, to begin with, Jaspers often speaks in 
quite traditional language. Elsewhere he employs Kantian language, 
and describes God as the "architect of the world11 • 2 More often, how-
ever, the Deity is simply called 11creator".3 In these passages God is 
taken to be "other" than the world, the One who brings the world into 
being and upon whom the being of the world depends. While he seems to 
assume creatio ~ nihilo, however, Jaspers apparently nowhere directly 
affirms it. 
Jaspers uses the language of creation, although he frequently 
insists that to speak of God as creator is to objectify him in an un-
warranted way. This of course is Jaspers' fundamental objection to~ 
1cf. the distinctions between various theisms in Charles 
Hartshorne and William Reese (eds. ), Philosophers Speak .2£ ~ (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 15 ff. 
2Jaspers, ~., III, p. 64. 
3cf., e.g., Jaspers, ~Origin~~ of History, pp. 91 ff.; 
Scope, p. 39. 
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discourse about God. But his difficulties with creation seem to be even 
more basic than this epistemological problem. As we pointed out in 
Chapter II, Jaspers' notion of the Encompassing is introduced specifi-
cally to avoid certain epistemic and metaphysical insolubilities. The 
"tension" embodied in this concept reflects itself in virtually every-
1 thing Jaspers says about God, man, or the world. 
Thus God, on Jaspers' terms, appears to be metaphysically 
distinct from the world, but epistemologically identical with it. 
That is, we never ~ God in isolation from the world. The world is 
always intermediary between Existenz and Transcendence. It may be 
questioned whether, in saying this, Jaspers has really clarified our 
situation. He ~ preserved human freedom: the latter is at least 
partially the result of the creative activity of God. The world is 
ultimately dependent, but man is at least partially independent. 
8. God and History 
If God is man's creator, in a mysterious but significant meta-
physical sense, how, if at all, is God related to the historical pro-
cess?2 The answer to this question, in terms of Jaspers' metaphysics, 
is somewhat more clear than the preceding issue, but less clear than we 
might wish. His view is frequently enunciated in words such as these: 
The One is rather the infinitely remote point of reference, which 
is Origin and Goal at one and the same time; it is the One of 
Transcendence • • • Universal history as a whole proceeds from 
1The world is "a struggle against God for God". (Origin, p. 92). 
2cf. John Hennig, "Jaspers' Attitude Toward History11 , in Schilpp, 
Jaspers, pp. 565-591. 
1 the One to the One • • • 
But whether or how God directs or otherwise influences the historical 
process remains unclear, and apparently deliberately so. Jaspers 
simply speaks in terms reminiscent of Plotinian emanationism: the 
world is somehow working its way back to God, who is its origin. But 
the details of this process are, for human consciousness, obscure, 
except as isolated historical "facts". 
One thing is clear: God does not interrupt history. It is 
essential for Jaspers' view that God remain, relative to human history, 
absolutely Transcendent to the world-process which is directed towards 
him. The symbols alone represent God in the world. 
The implications of this position for the Biblical claim to 
revelation is immediately obvious; several of these consequences will 
be elucidated in the next chapter. Here it must be noted that Jaspers 
explicitly rejects the Christian philosophy of history, which takes the 
life of Christ on earth to be history's focal point. Since he rejects 
the notion of Incarnation, Jaspers feels free to place the "axis" of 
history at about 500 B.C.---the median of the period from 800 to 200 
B. c. 2 This axial period embraces the age of the prophets, the flowering 
of Greek philosophy, and the germination of several Eastern religions. 
Thus history for Jaspers is not, as for the Bible, eschatologi-
cally oriented. It is vaguely oriented towards the One, but not in any 
1Jaspers, Origin, p. 264. 
2Jaspers, Way, pp. 99 ff. 
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distinctively theistic fashion. If history can be said to have a 
temporal goal, Jaspers thinks that this can only be the unity of m-
.£.m;!, that ideal state of "boundless connnunication11 in which men would 
individually and collectively realize their "depth of historicity". 1 
What relation this ideal state of affairs has to the future of Biblical 
religion---with which Jaspers asserts it is bound up2---remains unclear. 
One certainty is that ~ has played a major role in postponing what 
Jaspers takes to be the goal of history. It is to this issue we now 
turn. 
9. The Problem of Evil 
It is clear that Jaspers does not conceive of God as "active" 
in the traditional sense. Perhaps Aristotle 1 s Unmoved Mover is the 
closest analogue to Jaspers' conception. God is Pure Act, the eternal 
Pure Form. Jaspers at one point suggests, following the Platonic 
model, that in creation God "forms" the ''matter" of the world. 3 But 
all such metaphorical cosmologies are, for Jaspers, ultimately inadequate. 
The problem of evil, however, is an issue which cannot be avoided 
so easily as the question of the world's origin. It will not do to dis-
miss this problem lightly, Jaspers recognizes. Implicitly, the problem 
is apparent in his emphasis on the "ultimate situations" which confront 
every man in the form of guilt, suffering, and death. Explicitly, 
1:@id., p. 106. 
2J o·· 226 aspers, r~g~n, p. • 
3cf. Jaspers, ~., III, p. 65. 
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Jaspers deals with evil in more traditional terms.1 
The definition of evil which Jaspers employs follows from his 
analysis of the nature of Being. Evil is taken to be directly related to 
the division in Being, a division which, as we have seen, manifests 
itself in many ways, and whose tension is never fully overcome. The 
world is, for man, the arena of this tension. It is here, in the actual 
situations of life, that the problem of evil is most poignant. Jaspers 
asserts that 
theodizeen sind die Antworten auf die Fraga nach 
den Ubeln des Daseins, dar unvermeidlichen Schuld, 
nach dam b8sen Willen: wie konnte Gott in seiner 
Allmacht diese Welt so schaffen, dasz er diese Ubel 
und Ungerechtigkeiten zuliesz, dasz es das B8se 
gibt? Oder im wei tam Sinne: Wie ist im Dasein das 
Wertnegative begreiflich?2 
Here Jaspers lumps together both moral and natural evil: evil as a 
quality of behavior and evil as a quality of natural life.3 He is 
inquiring about the 11whyu of all evil. Why should evil have been permitted 
by God !!:., all? Is God really omnipotent and wholly good? 
The possible answers to these questions are many, but several 
have been predominant. The first of these Jaspers traces mainly to 
Indian philosophy and Greek mythology. On this view there is no one God 
who can be held responsible for evil. The world is ruled by impersonal 
law, and even to raise the question of evil is taken to be illegitimate. 
1cf. ~., pp. 75 ff., Wahrheit, pp. 898 ff. 
2Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
3For a fuller discussion of moral evil see Jaspers, Way, 
pp. 59-61. 
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Jaspers rejects this answer, simply because it is no answer at all, 
but an evasion of the true problem. 
Another solution has been proposed in dualistic terms. 
Manicheism and Gnosticism are taken by Jaspers to be the chief 
historical representatives of this point of view. The radically 
dualistic answer to evil is that God is not omnipotent, but is 
opposed by an equally powerful demonic principle. These two principles 
contend for the world, and manifest evil is one of the products of 
their warfare. A less radical dualism (e.g. that of Plotinus) sees 
matter as the cause of evil.1 Jaspers is unwilling to go to either of 
these extremes; however, and rejects all dualisms of this sort. 
Neither of the above views really makes God, as creator, 
responsible for the world. But if the problem of evil is considered 
specifically in these terms, then the range of possible solutions 
becomes quite small. In effect, God is conceived of either as not 
wholly good or else not omnipotent. Of the attempts that have been 
made to escape this dilemma, two predominate. One of these (the 
predestinarian position) holds that God is omnipotent, but has per-
mitted evil---for reasons largely inscrutable---in order to accomplish 
his purposes in the world. 2 This is part of the answer suggested by 
Biblical orthodoxy, the most familiar expression of which is to be 
found in the theology of Calvin. 
1cf. Plotinus, Enneads, Eighth Tractate, p. 67. 
2Jaspers, ~., III, p. 77. 
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Jaspers rejects this formulation on the grounds of its 
irrationality. It brings thought to a standstill, he argues, but not 
to rest. 1 A less objectionable solution is to be found in another 
version of the Biblical answer. In this view ~ himself is the key 
to the problem of evil. His misuse of the freedom bestowed upon him 
by God resulted in the Fall and all of its attendant consequences. 2 
This position is also finally unacceptable to Jaspers. He 
refuses to take the possibility of a Fall seriously,3 and prefers to 
believe that man's innate nobility has not been permanently scarred by 
evil. What answer, if any, remains? In Jaspers' view, there 12, no 
ultimate answer. We cannot, as some have thought, arrive at a 
coherently rational account of evil. Finite thought cannot come to 
grips with the depths of this issue, and must remain open in regard 
to the mystery of evil. 
Jaspers admits that it is quite possible to 11founder 11 in the 
face of this overwhelming enigma. But the encounter with evil, while 
an ultimate situation in itself, need not remain such. From it we 
can be elevated to a higher perspective of God and the world, and of 
our individual freedom. In brief, we may become more truly ourselves as 
a result of such an encounter.4 
1Jaspers, Wahrheit, p. 901. 
2The classic statement of this position has been made by 
Augustine. See~ Problem of~ Choice (De Libero Arbitrio), trans. 
Dom :Mark Pontifex (Uestminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1955), esp. 
pp. 35-38 and passim. Cf. Jaspers, Scope, p. 143. 
3cr. Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann, ~~Christianity 
(New York: Noonday Press, 1955), pp. 74-76. 
4Jaspers, ~., III, p. 78. 
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10. Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to elaborate Jaspers' 
conception of the God of Transcendence, as well as some of the implica-
tions of that conception. Presupposed was the metaphysical super-
structure outlined in Chapter II. Apart from this foundation it is 
impossible to understand Jaspers' idea of God and its relation to 
more traditional formulations. 
We have seen that Jaspers' positive statements about God are 
very few. "God is" is the central affirmation of philosophical faith, 
but beyond this bare affirmation it is dangerous to venture. All of 
our statements and beliefs about God must be considered symbols, and 
not as literally true. This includes such predicates as "love, 11 
"truth," and "personality." Presumably it also includes the predicate 
"creator, 11 although the problem of evil provides considerable diffi-
culties at this point.1 
It seems evident that Jaspers has not consistently adhered to 
his own metaphysical principles. He insists upon the validity of 
certain symbols, although there is no reason why this insistence, on 
his terms, should be considered anything more than prejudice. This 
will become particularly clear in the following chapter, where the 
question of revelation as a historical phenomenon will be discussed. 
The context of this discussion will be the relationship, as Jaspers 
1 
". • • We are faced with the question: is it God or the 
devil who governs the world? And though we may believe that ultimately 
the devil is iri the service of God, there is no proof of it." (Jaspers, 
Way, p. 108). 
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conceives it, of philosophical thinking to religion. To this subject 
we now turn our attention. 
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CaAPT:.<.;a IV 
T[I:_;; :=I.:ZLfi.TIOlJ OF P.:i:ILOSOPHY TO :=I.~~LIGim; 
1. Tho Idoa of God for Roligion a:'ld for Philosophy 
In the preceding chapter the attempt ~,-nc1,s madc to shoH that 
Jaspers' conception of God on a numbor of major issues is =tt variance 
"\-Iith more "traditional" beliefs. It might be objected, of course, 
that these traditional beliefs---derived largely from ChristiA.n 
ti1eology---are precisely those vJhose inadequacy Jaspers intends to 
shovJ. Tne reasons for this all,~ged inadequacy havd already been dis-
cussed; they are rootod in the basic concepts of Jaspors' metaphysics. 
Underlying virtually everything Jaspers s:1ys s.bout his concep-
tion of God as ineffable and unapproachable is a fundamentally hostile 
attitude to:crard systematic theology in General. Thic' hostility is 
most evident in his discussions '·'i th :?.udolf Bul tma:r.n 1 , nl thouzil it 
appears in his earliest major Horks. It is directed pd.:Jw.l~ily against 
the belief that theology can formulatr:O statenwnts about God ~rr1ich a:t·e 
true, not merely for the theologian or church :nakinc the!il, but for every-
one else as '>Jell. The philosopher rGcognizes that all characteriz3.tions 
of God are only symbolic, although a vTGal th of moaning is containod in 
those SJ11nbols, zi von t:w proper illumination. The theologia.'l, on the 
other hand, vrould have us believe that his stn.ternsnts J.bout God ara ~ 
1 Soe Jasp3rs !lnd Bulhnann, Hyth and Christianity. 
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t!1an symbols. T'nis attitude, Jaspr3;_~s fesls, displays an unjustifL;cl 
arrot;DJ1CG. 
Christian theology, of course, has not br:3en produced in ~· 
It is the result of a historical tradition, l1izhlit;lltJd by tln ui tness 
of tho Bible and tD.e Church, 1.;rhic:1 Christians belisv:; Has the result o.:: 
God 1 s Ul"h'llistakablo activity in a certP.in period of history. T.'le basic 
assumption of Judea-Christian religion is that God 1 s historiC ill sel1'-
disclosure is the basis for theoloi_;y. God is no longer hidd::m, but re-
vealed, although the apprehension of that r'welation requires ::m act of 
fait:1. '.Tith most of these pre;nises Jaspers is prepared to take oxcop-
tion. 'Je must no1r investigate his reasons for doing so. 
i. General Characteristic:; 
Jaspers defines ~·evelation as tho "im.mcdiate utto:~ar:cc o"!: God, 
localized in time and valid for all men, through crord, conr.nancbwnt, 
.1-. t 1!1 ac vJ.On, even · • This dr3fini tion is broad enou~h to include not only 
the Judea-Christian claim to revelation, but t:-10sc of other traditions 
(e.g. Islam) as Hell. ]o•.wver, Jaspers focuses his attention only on the 
form:;r, 'tThilo interpretint; the fact of conflicting claims to revelation 
as evidence azainst any ~ of them. 
~-T.'1at aJ'c) Jaspers objections to such cLlims? ]e sumcr,,:u~izos the~l 
in tho follNJing Hay: 
1 JaSDOl'S 
J. ' 
Truth and Symbol, p. 75. 
It cannot be denied that in such fo:·:c1 (i_. c;. rcv::;l0.tiorJ 
Tr.:u1sccndc11Cc :1as Sl)Ok311 l1istorically ~co~ 2.11011 '1Vc;r~)r;;-!:l:::::.,c. 
But men confussd cyphel~s ':Jith Bein:::; itsalf. ~v::m. 3::-
tornally the majority of mutually con.flictint:; rovt::lations 
speaks against all of.' them. It is tho al~rogailCU of ::1cn, 
crhich is disguised in sub:nission to suci:1 l~,.;volat.ion, to 
dcr.nnd of all other man, u..ndsl~ the n.:JJ;lo of ~:.u:·rili ty, sub-
.:-,1i~>sion to thoil~ m:n truth a.11d to thom.sclvos as its l'o:oro-
sentatives. 1 " 
One of Jaspers' objections, it saons, is ~ psycholo~ical (or 
per~la)s r.lOral) one: Uw proponsnts of rcvc:lation calcul-:.tingly 
suppos:::: that t:l8y can exact conformity to the t::.~uth 1rhic~1 :laS been 
all rclic;ions "dcnnand 11 belie:' of outsidc;rs. T'::l3 funda:mental difficulty, 
They :w VC' "ti::;d do-:.rn 11 , in 
Jasp:;rs 1 uor·ds, the speech o.f the Tra.nscc:;_d.·mt God, o11d .-:;'fili~~tod it 
1ri th a determinate time and pl::J.co. 2 
The consequences o:t' tl1is kind of 11 tyinz dmm 11 arc c~::cvc:::l'al. L1 
1:.no i'il'st place it has led to authoritati·..ro clair.1s on t'F:: p.s.rt of nmD:;.~-
ous rcli:~ions, claims ullich have led thoc1, not int'rcqu.::cntly, to Uw 
::;rosscst oxt:ccmos of intolerance. Ac;ain and again Jaspors r."mpha~;izos 
:1is i.r.lpatiencc '>Jit~1 religious dogmatism and clerical a.ut~1orit;:.1~ia.nisa, 
It is only a stop, he insists, fror:1 the .fori,10r to political totalitGTian-
isN. iJo one mtu1 or group has tl1e ri::;ht to l{:;zislate conccrnin:_:; the 
beliefs of anot~wr, and to tl1ink that this lS po.•:;sibl:.; i::; to b:; utte:cly 
deceived. 
1 Ibid., ~· 76. 
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ii. Biblicd :~eU::.;ion 
1
.1hon ho speaks of relizious authorito.ria.nism, J~JS)Jc'S i1a::J in 
mind priiuo.rily the Christian tradi tion---a.t 1 :;ast in its n::;.~~ro1 Io:c, 
or orthodox, form. 1 
in his Hritings. Jasps:cs c;iv,3s full 1~eco;3nition to the profound in-
fluonc.; of C~ristiani ty upon 1,Jesto:':'n cul tu::.·e and, s :J:Jcifica.lly, 
3.l1d s:--::c r)S S G S • 
pository of Divine 1·evclation, and as suc~l the product o::: ;-,10''0 than 
lmr.12.n derivation. JasDo~·s 1 approach to th::: Dibl::; is rc:vcol'cmt, but 
at tl-:e same tL.'Uo critical: he discovers in it a peculiar innc:n~ 
tension. Tho Bible, ~1:: believes, is full o:' antir..omies and cont,·a-
dictor-y sta.temonts clhich. cennot bo te.ken at face value. ~~ve11 do ctrin-
ally the::;o polarities seen, fo:::- hi::J, to constitute t:1r; ~ra:·p and ~roo.f 
of scripture.2 
T T 
.J8 
ought to recoGnize, J aspol'S asserts, t:1at t':c Bible is a :no.ny-sidod, 
OY-Jaquo, somoHl1at cont:.~adictory book. Its .1.utho:r.'s ~rc>:~e: o.fte:;~· ::ell 
hw:w.n, ond tho Bibl·::; ~'eflects thei:c hu.m.anity. I:::' \ic: o.~·:c to rocovo:::-
1 Cf. his ll;lporto.nt distinction bobJeen 11 orthodo:::y" and 
11libc;:::·:e.lism 11 in lfyth, ;}p. 37-56. 
2cf. J aspcr:3, Sco>Y;, pp. 99-1 00. 
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lattel' fro::-:1 the fixations uhich have encru:::;tod it.1 This Trill :;:.1c::a_..'1, 
as t~1e 11 :::-elic:;ion of Christ. 11 
At this point '.Ie must pause, becc.us:::: J asp::::rs 1 on tire criti::_tue 
of Christianity l~ests upon his conception o_: t11e 11rcli:.:;ion or Christ. 11 
~Jhat cxactJyis his attitudo to'>Jard the doctrine of' t~-18 Incarnation? 
It may bo profitable to ansuc;:c~ this question in t:c.o li3ht o£' ?Cio:d:o-
to und::;rstand and avaluato Jaspers 1 position on ti1is £\udancmtal 
is sus. 
iii. :Cicrke__:;aa:cd and J aspo_;_·s or'. t::H::: Incarnation 
thee cb.i.ms of Christianity, and affirms t~1at God ~1as in i'2.ct disclos?d 
T~1o hidden God, undiscovarablP by r8:ctson, ~-ws b::::n :c•cv:cal=d 
to faith. 
history in the forr,l of :: person, :-Tho i;; both 11 tiYJ l1istorical :~0.ad2 
But t:'lo full sic;nificanco of thi= >;10:1·::;:1tou:> b::.·sakth.coug:1 is 
not 3.l'Uenablo to rational consciousness. 
1 Ibid., ·o. 104. 
--- . 
?hilosop:1ical ?ra,~::wnts, p. 76. 
d b ~ . t para ox arorc l , 
cal. '.f'lat is domandod, tin2.lly, is belief a:,;ain.st ::.·cason (credo ~ 
The object of faith is t~ms God 1 s l'Cality in c;:~i.st-:mc::; a.s '1 
~articula:c individual, the fact that God h.~1s c::ist:;d as ''.n 
individual ln.mr.m being • • • Christis.nity i::; no doctrine con-
corni..11g the 1.mity of tho divine and t~l3 hmo.an, 01• concc~·ninc 
tho idcmtity o:: subject and obj9ct; nor is it any oi' t:,c ot-l:.c · 
logical transcriptions of Christianity. If Ch:.·istianity 'iTcro 
a doctrine, tho :::·Glationship to it ~rould not bo one or :.~.it~1, 
for an intellectual typo of rolations:.-1ip crm co~·~·ospond to a 
doctrine. Christianity is therofol·e not a doct1·ine, but the: ~ t t' .L ~ ' • • t d 1 Iac na~ uoa nas exls e • 
If it t:-·110' 
tho implications u:lich :nve boon dra~m rrom it cannot be d.=miod validit~r. 
T.1is muc:1 J as ;;e:,·s adrnits: 
:-J:Mttc dc:e iJ.no Gott in dc:c ~J3lt sich offenbart in oinc3r 
oinzigcn G.:;stal t, l1Htte -er also aYl eine::- Stell-s in "=?..:nul 
und Zsit und :11.m :1lor e;esprochcn, so ~;Hro die \utoritMt 
die; so:~ Off,ombarunc; zu::;lr;ich ftfr all3 __:;til tis. Dic'l 
KEttholizitHt ":rHre unumgb'nglich, crm111 elias:; O;cenbacuY:::_: 
Tatbcstancl ·.rMr~;. 2 
duciblo consoquenc9, 
is everytl:.ing orthodoJ,:Y i1as made him out to b'J. Jasno~s thus docs 
1 :"<11"'811 ·r~ n-.. 1•c:>"J"'la''·-l OU.. -~-JJ. t"\.'-..-UL-- , ... u,.' 
David ? • 3~-.ronsoj1 ,:J.nd ~.J.:1.lt3:~ 
P..ceciS, 19L:-1), lY[J, 290-291. 
It is an absurdit,y t:1at God sho'J~d b.;con::.: 
Concluding Uno;clsntL'ic Postscript, tr~::1s. 
Lo"'""" (Pr~l· ·"'c.---to'1 · ":l.,...; "'~'-'to•1 U·1;l· v·""~l· ty' " - ........ _, ~l. ~-· .l • .. - __ ... \ ... ,_, ~ ~ ..._ ... ..:., ...... 
2Jaspors, ·~hrhcit, pp. 850-851. 
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man, or that a man should be God. We are told: 
The religion of Christ contains the truth that God speaks 
to man through man. But God speaks through many men, in 
the Bible through the successive prophets of whom Jesus 
is the last. .Ng_ !!.!!!1 .£!!!.be QQ.g,: God speaks exclusively 
through no man, and whit is more, his speech through every 
man has many meanings. (italics mine) 
Jaspers insists, however, that it is not the notion of absurdity 
itself he objects to. He freely admits the inevitability of contra-
dictions and paradoxes in philosophical thinking. But this, he thinks, 
is the absurdity par excellence. Why is this the case? Simply because 
~ absurdity has resulted in the formation of a dogma and set of be-
liefs concerning it. Instead of opening our thinking, it has closed 
it: 
Fftr Philosophie ist der Gottmensch eine in die Irre fHhrende 
Absurditllt. Si.e befreit nicht, sondern beengt. Sie fffhrt 
nicht im Aufschwung der Liebe zur Tranzendenz, sondern 
bindet an ein Dogma, das in der Tat leer lllszt und nach 
voller denkender Vergegenwllrtigung nur noch in Gewalt-
samkeit geglaubt werden kann. Die unvergleichliche Wir-
kung aber dieser absurden Vorstellung in einem Glauben, 
der die Tiefen im Menschen hervorgetrieben ~at, ist fHr 
die Philosophie ein unumgllngliches Problem. 
The argument here is the same one which Jaspers was earlier 
seen to use against the personification of the Deity. The doctrine of 
the Incarnation is in fact the supreme example of such personification. 
Against it must be urged the same objections which Jaspers feels are 
applicable to ~ similar misconception. 
1Jaspers, Scope, p. 105. Cf. An almost identical comment in 
Jaspers' essay, 11Kierkegaard 11 , in Rechenschaft und Ausblick, p. 117. 
2Jaspers, Wahrheit, p. 85). 
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In brief, the first of these objections is that the doctrine 
in question unhesitatingly "objectifies" God by making him localizable 
in time and space. 1 But God cannot, on Jaspers' grounds, become an ob-
ject to consciousness. God is the Encompassing Itself, and this totali-
ty certainly cannot be confined to or realized in a particular man. An 
individual man may be a symbol---perhaps the highest symbol---of the 
Absolute Encompassing which is God, but he cannot be God himself. 2 
MOreover, Jaspers maintains, the idea of the Incarnation is 
morally objectionable. It leads men, when allied with other doctrines, 
to reject the empirical world in its full reality. But, what is even 
more crucial, it leads men to neglect their common bond with all 
humanity. In short, it fosters intolerance and authoritarianism, 
rather than the "good works" which Christianity professes to foster) 
Jaspers and Kierkegaard thus come to radically different con-
elusions regarding the doctrine of the Incarnation. For both the 
Incarnation is an absurdum. But Kierkegaard accepts this absurdum in 
a sacrifice of the intellect, while Jaspers rejects it. Here, Jaspers 
holds, the line between catholic Christianity and non-catholic philoso-
phy must be clearly drawn.4 
1cf. Jaspers, ~' p. 41. 
2Jaspers, Wahrheit, pp. 8.54-855. 
3rt is interesting that Kant was able to interpret Christianity 
in solely ethical terms, Without finding it necessary to dispense with 
the Incarnation quite so sUll'lllla.rily as does Jaspers. Cf. Religion ~­
in~ Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. 
Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), especially pp. 145 ff. 
4cf. J. Sperna Weiland, Philosophy of Existence and Christi-
anity (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1951), p. 70. 
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But at least one major problem remains: On what grounds is it 
asserted that the doctrine of the Incarnation, as set forth by the 
Gospels and believed by the church, is untrue? Who, in fact, ~the 
historical Jesus whom Christianity acknowledges as the Christ? Unfortu-
nately, Jaspers' answers to these questions are rather vague and unsatis-
factory. They turn, in the main, upon his notion of s,ymbol---or, in 
this case, mh_. 
iv. The ''Christ Myth" 
The word "myth, 11 as Jaspers uses it, is essentially synonymous 
with "cipher" or "symbol." It refers to "a language of images, ideas, 
1 figures, and events, all of which point to the supernatural." As we 
have seen, the symbols of this ''language" are to be found everywhere 
and in everything. In the context of Biblical religion the idea of 
myth becomes, for Jaspers, especially useful. In opposition, at this 
point, to Rudolf Bultmann, he insists that to demythologize religion 
is to destroy 11the richness of religious life. u2 • • 
The Bible, Jaspers holds, is a book of "mythical contents."3 
While historical, its language is none the less ambiguous. And al-
though a given biblical myth may be significant for someone's personal 
experience, no one has a right to assert that the myth in question is 
universally valid. Myths convey "existential truth11 only and that in 
1Jaspers, ~' p. 85. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid.' p. 20. 
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a particular historical situation. 1 
What, then, of the "Christ myth*'? Jaspers' answer is that the 
Jesus of Christianity is an undeniably historical figure. To the 
philosopher he represents, in terms of his life and ministry, the in-
corporation of the kind of faith sought by philosophical thinking at 
its best. As a man, he represents questioning of God, obedience to God, 
and the unending search for God. 
But Jesus was not and did not claim to be God. The ''myth of 
Christ," Jaspers asserts, arose when his followers, for whom he was a 
symbol of Transcendence, transformed him into "the way, the truth, and 
the life. 11 They elevated Christ to Deity against his wishes, and in 
effect made untrue (by asserting it as true for all) what was not in-
tended to become 11truth"---in that sense---at a11. 2 Thus "Christ 
religion 11 came into existence, with its claim to authority and uni ver-
sality based on the teachings of Jesus himself. This, for Jaspers, is 
the root of the tragedy of Christ and Christianity.3 
What is the positive significance of the Christ-myth? 
• • • There is in the Christ myth the indication that every-
thing human has in it the possibility of relatedness to God, 
God-nearness, and that the wa~ to God goes through the world 
and through the reality of our historically to4be determined human nature, and not by by-passing the world. 
1Ibid., pp. 18 ff. MY intention here is not to contrast 
Jaspers and Bultmann, but rather to emphasize Jaspers' position con-
cerning religious myths. For Bultmann's position, in which he agues 
mainly against Jaspers' refusal to take the problem of hermeneutics 
seriously, see pp. 57-71. 
2weiland, Philosophy 2! Existence ••• , pp. 70-71. 
3cf. Jaspers, Wahrheit, pp. 924, 949. 
4Jaspers, Truth~ Symbol, pp. 76-77. 
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This is certainly much less than we might have expected, for in effect 
it reduces the Incarnation to the status of one symbol among many. 
Jaspers admits that, in viewing Christianity, he speaks from 
a philosophical standpoint. Virtually all of his considerations of 
religion have as their backdrop the ceaseless tension between philoso-
phy and religion. We have already indicated, in terms of the above 
discussion of revelation, what Jaspers takes to be the most specific 
instance of the conflict between religion and philosophy. We must now 
briefly summarize the general premises which underlie his conviction 
that this tension is a necessary and insoluble one. 
). The Continuing Tension Between Philosophy and Religion 
That there is in fact a tension between religion and philosophy 
is, I think, quite evident, although an intensive historical analysis 
would be needed to show the many specific forms this tension has assumed 
at different times. At certain times the tension has been much less 
evident than at others. In fact, as Dilthey points out, so close is 
the kinship between religion and philosophy that, for the Greek apolo-
gists, Christianity~ philosophy.1 
As already noted, Jaspers is not unaware of this kinship, for he 
pays tribute to the powerful impetus Christianity has given to Western 
philosophy. But equally evident is his strong opposition to the claims 
of Christianity, as well as those of !& other religious system. Phi-
1Wilhelm Dilthey, ~Essence 2! Philosophy, trans. Stephen 
A. Emery and William T. Emery (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1961), p. 28. 
losophy must, in Jaspers' view, contend ceaselessly with religion. It 
must do so, however, in a continual spirit of communicativeness; despite 
the dim prospects of ever reaching an amicable settlement, the inter-
change must continue.! 
There is one basic question, Jaspers feels, which is at the 
root of the conflict between religion and philosophy. That question 
is: Where does God speak to us?2 Presupposed, of course, is the as-
sumption that God ~ speak to men. On this point, at least, Jaspers 
thinks religion and genuine philosophy are agreed. 3 Where they differ 
lies in the answer they give to this question. Religion, for its part, 
insists that God speaks to man only through the medium of historical 
revelation, or through some sort of worldly reality. Religion demands 
concreteness; it wishes to localize the voice of God in time and space. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, insists that no historical 
tradition can adequately convey the message of the Transcendent God. 
At best it can only prepare us to hear God. Transcendence "speaks 
in the freedom of self-existence as the medium in which man. • • must 
!"Philosophy and religion are enemies, and because they are 
enemies they have need of one another. There is no religion without 
some philosophic basis, no philosophy without roots in religion."---
Miguel de Unamuno, ~ Tragic Sense .Q! Life, trans. J. E. Crawford 
Flitch (London: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 113-114. 
2Karl Jaspers, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. E. B. 
Ashton (New York: Russell F. MOore, 1952), pp. 93 ff. 
~aturalism, of course, is not really "true philosophy", since, 
in Jaspers' view, it refuses to go beyond the world in explaining the 
world. 
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be God-given to himself ••• 111 The emphasis here upon freedom is im-
portant, for Jaspers is quite certain that the obedience to its tenets 
demanded by religion is inimical to the freedom which only genuine 
philosophy can preserve. Philosophy strives for independence, whereas 
religion tends to inhibit the independence of thought. 
The fundamental philosophical quarrel with religion, we may 
conclude, has two aspects: One is epistemological, the other moral. 
Epistemologically, religion goes astray in thinking that it has gained 
access to a knowledge of God which supersedes the risk of faith. It 
thus claims too much for itself, and may easily end in arrogance. 
Religion tends to forget that faith is not knowledge, and that 11that 
which I can prove I do not need to believe. 112 
MOrally, religion errs in supposing that it can set itself 
up as authoritative for all men, In so doing, Jaspers believes, it 
makes possible the enforced belief which accompanies totalitarianism. 
Religion is fundamentally intolerant; this is its very nature. It in-
sists that what is true for a few must be true for a11. 3 
One of the chief virtues of philosophy, Jaspers frequently 
reiterates, is that it eschews just this sort of exclusivism. Philoso-
phy remains 11open, 11 while religion tends to be closed. Philosophy, in 
short, is essentially humanistic. , It is this-worldly; i.e. concerned 
only about man's present condition, with all of its attendant limita-
1Jaspers, Existentialism !!¥!. Humanism, p. 94. 
2Jaspers, ~., I, p. 303 
3Ibid., pp. 307 ff. 
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tions, conflicts, and tragedies. 
Philosophy has become the foundation of man's true being ••• 
No longer does the revealed Deity upon whom all is dependent 
come first, and no longer the world that exists around us. 
What comes first is man, who, however, can not make termr 
with himself as being, but strives to transcend himself. 
The humanistic creed expressed in the above quotation has been modified 
to some extent in recent years, but it is still representative, I think, 
of Jaspers' over-all view. Faith in man, he came to realize, pre-
supposes faith in the God through whom he is. 1Without faith in God, 
faith in man degenerates into contempt for man ••• 112 
This qualification, however, does not significantly alter, in 
rrry view, the humanism of Jaspers' position. "Faith in God, 11 in the 
last analysis, means faith in the symbols which speak to us in the 
Existenz of our historicity. There can be no genuine faith in God 
apart from faith in the human situation, for in men alone is there 
the consciousness of God. We cannot seize the hand of God, in any 
literal sense, but ttwe can seize the hand of our companion in fate."J 
Jaspers' humanism is not basically an optimistic one. Unlike 
Julian Huxley, for example, who is confident that scientific method is 
gradually discrediting the "God hypothesis 114 and opening the way for 
1Jaspers, Man !ll ~ Modern Age, p. 156. 
2Jaspers, The Origin and 92!l 2f History, p. 220. 
)Jaspers, Scope, p. 1)6. 
4cf. Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation (New York: 
Mentor Books, 1957), especially 11Preface." 
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the full utilization of the 11total dynamic of knowledge, 11 Jaspers re-
mains uncertain about the future of mankind. He is unafraid to let the 
sciences do their necessar,y work, for he insists that the reality of God 
cannot be touched by scientific method. God is not to be found in the 
world, and yet he ceaselessly speaks through the world. This is 
Jaspers' unshakable conviction. Unfortunately it is not the conviction 
of many contemporar,y individuals. They, too, feel something of the 
"universal homselessness 111 of which Jaspers speaks, but seem unable 
to find the transcendental certitude by which he lives. 
Is it enough for man to ''merge himself in the world," and there 
forge out his destiny? Can men together arrive at a certitude which 
they seem incapable of reaching independently? Jaspers does not offer 
convincing answers to these questions. His last word seems to be that 
man ultimately stands alone in the world, however much he may strive 
to communicate with others. God is inaccessible, at least objectively, 
and yet the meaning of life depends upon his speaking to us. This is 
the paradoxical situation in which man finds himself, and which is at 
the root of the "ultimate situations" which threaten to engulf and make 
shipwreck of his fragile vessel. 
It remains to be seen whether Jaspers' philosophy offers an 
adequate account of the nature of man and his relationship to God. It 
must also be questioned whether his view of God is finally cogent. Be-
fore evaluating Jaspers' concept of God, however, it will be necessary 
to briefly summarize the main points in Jaspers' metaphysical system. 
1Jaspers, ~ in ~ Modern ~' pp. 202-203. 
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C:.APTSR V 
CONCLUSION 
Tnis chapter will consist of a summary of the dominant motifs 
of Jaspers' philosophy, particularly with reference to hi·s concept of 
God. A br:ief critical evaluation of the latter will be offered, although 
no exhaustive or final appraisal is here attempted. 
1. Summary 
The purpose of this thesis has been to determine the place of 
the concept of God in Karl Jaspers' metaphysical philosophy. To accom-
plish this purpose it was necessary to introduce at some length the major 
aspects of Jaspers' philosophy. These may be briefly restated. 
Jaspers' conception of philosophy hin3es on what he assumes to be 
the goal of !!!, philosophizing, whether this goal is articulated or not. 
Philosophy aims at attaining a consciousness of Being. Specifically, 
its goal is the Being of Transcendence, the 1101:her 11 which lies beyond 
the horizons of human thought and the observable world. 
The difficUlties in achieving such a consciousness are several. 
The first of these is the epistemological barrier. Because of it, as 
Kant made clear, there can be no conceptual knowledge of a realm which 
transcends the space-time order. It is this barrier, Jaspers believes, 
vrhich forces us to distinguish between the being in >fhich ~ as indi-
viduals participate, and the Being which is ~anscendent to any par-
ticular individual. But while it is apparent that such a distinction 
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does exist, .it is not necessary to assume that there is no relation-
ship between the phenomenal world of experience and the noumenal 
'i..Jorld of absolute Being. 
The concept of the ~~compassing is the vehicle by means of 
which Jaspers hope to bridge the absolute epistemological dichotomy 
which apparently obtains between subject and object. The Encompassing 
is the cosmic fabric which binds together all of the manifest polar-
ities within it. Basic to all such polarities, however, are the three 
irreducible realms of personality, nature (the world), and Transcen-
dence. While intimately related, these can never be fully assimi-
lated to one another. 
This would seem to imply that the quest for Being is a mis-
guided venture. Jaspers thinks not. He finds the clue to man's po-
tential self-fulfillment in man himself. Man is a multi-dimensional 
being: as a historical being he is an empirical existent; as a think-
ing being he is characterized by intellection; as a spiritual being 
he is a unified personality. And yet man is not limited to these 
levels of being. Potentially he is man as man ought to be and, in 
3xistenz, is. But Existenz is an ideal state, not a commonplace actu-
ality. It is attained by only a few men. Men in general approximate 
it most closely in times of personal crisis and conflict. It is sit-
uations of guilt, struggle, suffering, and death which make us most 
aware of the depth of our being in its relation to the other. 
For Jaspers, the origin and goal of existence is that which 
philosophy terms Being Itself or the Absolute Encompassing, but which 
no names can adequately describe. This ultimate reality is identical 
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with the Deity of religious aspiration. It matters little wnether 
we characterize Being as Transcendence, God, or something else. Wnat 
is important is that vTe recognize that the being of which l-Ie are a 
part is related also, in a potentially illuminating way, to the Being 
which at once Transcends and 3ncompasses us. Thus the different forms 
which diverse faiths (both philosophical and religious) give to their 
essentially similar quests are really less different than might be 
supposed. And yet no man, while he may share another's conviction 
about reality, can expect someone else to believe as he himself does. 
No statement about the Ultimate can be universally valid. 
But why is this so? Simply because, according to Jaspers, 
all experience of Transcendence---whether mystical, aesthetic, or 
otherwise---is ambiguous and opaque. A given experience can capture, 
at best, but a glimpse of Transcendence, for the latter is hidden and 
can never be known. All of our experience of Transcendence, however 
apparently immediate, is in fact mediated by symbols. These are the 
vehicles of ~aning which convey to us---when we are prepared to listen 
to them---something of the Being which reason alone cannot reach. Al-
though limitlessly varied, the symbols become meaningful only to the 
individual whose self-enlightenment has prepared him to receive their 
message. '\ole cannot say that a symbol must be meaningful for anyone; 
to do this is to objectify falsely both the symbols and (by implica-
tion) the Reality to 1-1hich they point and in 'tvhich they participate. 
The implications of this metaphysical view for religion and 
theology are considerable. Specifically, the conception of God enter-
90 
tained by Christianity, and the belief in revelation on which it is 
based, will have to be reinterpreted. There is one criterion, above 
all, by which to judge the adequacy of a particular religious claim. 
That criterion, Jaspers feels, is a moral one. The essence of moral-
ity is a "total vTill to communication, 11 and apart from this charac-
teristic no individual's experience of God can be granted more than 
psychological significance. 
All theological statements which purport to characterize in 
actuality the Transcendent God must be considered suspect. They betray 
an attitude of unwarranted presumption, especially since they are 
usually asserted to be universally valid and and authoritative. Fnil-
osophical thinking, by contrast, opposes such universal statements, 
and urges that while men !!l find Transcendence through a given re-
ligious form, there is no assurance that they have not been deluded. 
ill experience of God, as well as all discourse about him, is hazardous 
and uncertain. 
Philosophy begins and ends in wonder, in perpetual search. 
Jaspers insists that while reason is our surest guide in most matters, 
it will not take us beyond its limits. There comes a point when only 
submissive silence can eqpress that to which the deepest longings of 
a man 1s spirit aspires. In this silence the faith of philosophy is 
given expression, a faith which recognizes that God is hidden and that 
no human effort can bring God to man. 
Jaspers• concept of God, it needs to be repeated, does not 
stand alone. It is one aspect of a closely-knit metaphysical scheme. 
In terms of this metaphysics, God plays a vital yet paradoxical role. 
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He is at once the Ground of Being---the all-inclusive Encompassing---
and the Other to which we know ourselves opposed. Thus God is, in 
one sense1, immanent, although bow this can be so must remain a 
mystery. For thought, however, God is eternally Transcendent and 
unknowable. 
In holding to this view Jaspers believes he is speaking for the 
great philosophers of all ages, individuals who recognized that their 
metaphorical attempts to picture ultimate reality were only poor attempts 
after all. Yet they did not despair of such constructions, but strove to 
make existentially meaningful the insights given to them. Philosophers 
today should emulate these great thinkers of the past. 
The merits of this viewpoint notwithstanding, it is necessary 
to ask whether Jaspers' conception of God actually comes to grips with 
certain vital theological issues. The additional questions of whether 
his critique of theology is justified, and whether his own reformula-
tion of the question of God is more adequate, must also be raised. 
The remainder of this thesis will deal with several of these critical 
issues, although no final answers will be attempted. 
2. Critical Evaluation 
Jaspers' positive contributions to religious philosophy need to 
be kept in mind, especially when a critical survey is made of his over-
all metaphysical position. One of these contributions is his emphasis 
on the necessity of learning from the insights of past philosophical and 
1some interpreters think Jaspers makes God wholly immanent, al-
though this interpretation is questionable. 
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religious thinkers. Another is his insistence on the primacy of man 
as a being who is able to ask ultimate questions. Jaspers rightly 
refuses to reduce man either to mere intellect or organic structure. 
Man is more than the sum of his self-knowledge. Again, Jaspers has 
helped to focus attention upon the complementary aspects of philosophy 
and religion. Too few contemporary philosophers are willing to take 
religion---especially revealed religion---seriously at all. Jaspers' 
recognition of the importance of all religious affirmations, despite 
his disclaimers about their universal validity, is also noteworthy. 
These emphases of Jaspers' have been called "positive," al-
though this is not intended to imply that he has made no other positive 
contributions, nor that his metaphysics is primarily negative. His 
treatment of religious and theological questions ~primarily critical, 
yet underlying this criticism at virtually every point is Jaspers' 2i!!l 
conception of God. In this connection is is necessary to raise certain 
critical questions about Jaspers' theological presuppositions, and to 
ask whether these presuppositions (and their implications) are warranted 
by either the data of experience or the demands of human personality. 
Two basic issues need to be raised, issues which are closely 
related to one another. One of these is essentially epistemological, 
the other ontological (or theological). It will be impossible to de-
marcate these issues precisely, since as we have seen they are (at 
least for Jaspers) tightly bound together. None the less, our first 
remarks will be directed primarily to the problem of epistemology. 
Jaspers insists that "God is" must be the affirmation of philoso-
phical faith. This is also the minimum assertion of religious faith, 
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although the latter of course goes much further. Such an affirmation 
is necessary, we are told, because thinking as such cannot span the 
chasm which separates the Being of God from the being of man. For 
human consciousness the rupture in Being is unbreachable, though for 
Transcendence it is not. Still, the God who is irretrievably hidden 
speaks to man. The paradox at this point is that God speaks in a 
language which only the awakened consciousness (personality) can 
understand. And, while God speaks to men, they cannot communicate 
with him. Even to designate God a person, in fact, is to go beyond 
the limits of our knowledge, and risks losing God entirely. 
The difficulty in the above argument lies in the fact that 
Jaspers has overstated his case concerning the unknowability of God. 
There can be no doubt that a gulf ~ separate man from the Transcen-
dent Other, and that no superficial theology or metaphysics can easily 
avoid foundering in the face of this impasse. The 11x11 realm of the 
non-phenomenal order may easily be discarded as a fiction, but Jaspers 
refuses to accept this too facile alternative. There ia evidence that 
Transcendence can and does speak to us, he asks us to believe. But 
what interpretation are we to place upon the suggestions and dimly as-
certainable clues at our disposal? Perhaps they are merely the echoes 
of human aspiration. What assurance have we that there is an Other 
beyond the world we sensibly perceive? 
Jaspers makes no attempt to convince us that a Transcendent 
reality whom we may call God does in fact exist. Its existence (more 
accurately, Being) is assumed, and is taken to be of a certain nature. 
From this assumption Jaspers draws the consequences which have been 
elucidated throughout this thesis. 
In going beyond epistemology, however, Jaspers has fallen into 
certain basic inconsistencies. It is undeniable that inconsistencies 
plague our thinking, but it seems that they ought to be avoided where 
possible, or at least admitted. The point is this: If God is utterly 
Transcendent, hidden, and unknowable, then nothing we say or believe 
about him can yield anything more than subjective or psychological 
certitude. It is impossible to speak meaningfully about God in the 
expectation that we are literally referring to the Deity. 
Jaspers seems to admit this. At the same time, he asks us to 
believe that some negative statements about God ~ possible. He re-
fuses, in other words, to concede that ]£ meaningful discourse about 
God is possible, an affirmation his explicit position would seem to 
demand. He has a doctrine of Transcendence which says that such a 
doctrine is impossible. 1 The chief tenet of this "doctrine" is the 
assertion that through the s,ymbolic medium of our own enlightened self-
hood, as well as through the world about us, we may come to an awareness 
of God. Yet Jaspers admits that this understanding may well be a de-
lusion; there may be no reality which conforms to our hopes. 
Given this admission, why not remain skeptical about such a 
reality? Why not simply refuse to believe, on the grounds that, sub-
jectively, insufficient evidence exists? Jaspers constantly reiterates 
that all light from the One of Transcendence is individually appropriated; 
1J. von Rintelen, Beyond Existentialism, trans. Hilda Graef (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1961 ), p. 206. 
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it cannot, as an experience, be shared with someone else. He does not 
clearly face the inquiry of skepticism, nor the related question of ~ 
self-transcendence (the key to a readiness to understand God) is to be 
achieved. He simply assumes that all men ~ the capacity for such 
transcendence, and that they do in fact aspire to achieve it. This 
assumption, it seems, is unwarranted by the facts of experience. 
Jaspers' critique of other conceptions of God---especially 
that of orthodox Christianity---is based upon the premise that God is 
unknowable. Yet his very critique presupposes elements of knowledge 
(or at least reasonable conviction) which he denies to others. Every 
negative statement he makes about God---for example, that he sets no 
store by cult and sacrifice1---is subject to the identical critique 
he offers of other theologies. Thus his entire critique of religion 
and theology threatens, as one commentator notes, to dissolve into 
"point of view" philosophizing. 2 
Jaspers' critique of religion and theology contains many ele-
ments which are descriptively accurate. When he becomes normative in 
his appraisal, however, some of the questions which have been suggested 
come to the forefront. It is descriptively accurate to say that the 
Jesus of the Bible was a great moral teacher whose influence has been 
incalculable. It is normatively questionable whether the statement 
11No man can be God" is true. Jaspers does not ~that this statement, 
1Jaspers, Scope, p. 80. 
2J. N. Hartt, 11God, Transcendence and Freedom in the Philosophy 
of Karl Jaspers," Review 2£ Metaphysics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (December, 
19.50), p. 2.58. 
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and others like it, may be true for a particular individual. 1 What 
he intends to deny is that the statement itself is or can be true. 
It is difficult to see just what meaning the word "truth" retains 
when its applicability is limited so severely. Jaspers does speak of 
the "absolutely true112, but this absolute state of affairs cannot be 
confirmed or disconfirmed in any way. He affirms that truth is always 
a mode of agreement3, but will not allow that any agreement must be 
universal. No individual truth claim can be imposed upon someone 
else. If Jaspers simply means that personal assent must be given to 
a statement in order for it to become true, his argument is unimpeach-
able. It is less obvious that some propositions are not true apart 
from whether they are assented to or not. 
Jaspers is a metaphysician, not a psychologist---although the 
distinction between these roles may at times appear doubtful, as it 
does in Kierkegaard. The question may now be raised: Is Jaspers' 
conception of God, epistemological considerations aside, adequate? 
Is it enough to affirm that "God is," without any verifiable idea of 
what God is like? Is it only possible, moreover, to describe God as 
Being, and not as~ Being? In Jaspers' view these questions demand 
affirmative answers. 
It is questionable, on the other hand, whether Jaspers' appeal 
to the primacy of symbols in religious experience can provide satis-
1Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics," in Schilpp, Jaspers, p. 763. 
2Jaspers, Way, p. 47. 
3Jaspers, Reason ~ Existenz, p. 105. 
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fying answers of the sort here demanded. Is it sufficient to say that 
symbols by themselves can yield rich and meaningful religious experi-
ence? Jaspers seems not to have realized the predicament of the 
symbol in our age. 1 He has allowed everything to become symbolic. 
But where there is no commonly accepted transcendental order, of what 
use is it to urge the potential meaningfulness of symbols? When belief 
in ~ has superseded belief in Providence, it is difficult to see that 
notions such as the "transparency" of all materiality can adequately 
emphasize the cogency of a supra-naturalistic metaphysics. 
Jaspers' effort to be as preservative as possible---by allowing 
everything to become symbolic---is founded upon sound motives. 2 Yet 
the notion of symbol appears to be largely useless apart from some 
way to discriminate between symbols. Jaspers asserts that there ~ 
certain symbols which are universally meaningful (such as ultimate 
situations), but he fails to offer reasons why these are more signifi-
3 
cant of Transcendence than any others. His reply might be that the 
answer to this question is self-evident, but the fact that it can be 
asked at all suggests that this is not the case. 
Is Jaspers a theist? That he does not wish to be a pantheist 
seems evident, but it is equally certain that he does not unequivocally 
1cf. Erich Heller's illuminating comments on this in The Disin-
herited~ (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 210 ff. -
2cf. F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958) pp. 61-6~-
3cf. Karl Barth's critique in Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. 
Bromiley et. al. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1960), III, 2, p. 114. 
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embrace theism. 1 As on so many other issues, Jaspers prefers to remain 
11open 11 on the question of God and his actual relationship to the world 
and man. This preference, it seems, finally vitiates much of his theo-
logical metaphysics. 9:2£ is not a "Thou, 11 he asserts, but another in-
dividual is. We are told that 
• • • real communication takes place only between men and rests 
in the final analysis upon faith • • • Arry other communication 
can be asserted only as a simile, inasmuch as it is carried out 
by us one-sidedly.2 
This admission appears to damage severely Jaspers' attempt to 
make the reality of God existentially meaningful. It virtually reduces 
his philosophy to an affirmation of the primacy of Existenz and the 
secondary role of Transcendence. Man, not God, is of primary concern, 
for man is fated to communicate only with his fellow man. 
This theme is not new in modern thought, although its peculiar 
schematism is. The absence of God from the human scene has been empha-
sized by numerous recent thinkers. What is particularly disappointing 
about Jaspers' philosophy is that it attempts to make the ~ of God 
a reality for human existence, while at the same time wishing to have 
all knowledge of God held in abeyance. It seems evident that this at-
tempt has been a failure. To the extent, however, that Jaspers has 
helped to make the idea of God again significant for philosophy, he has 
made a valuable contribution to contemporary thought. 
1
cf. Hartt, "God, Transcendence and Freedom in the Philosophy 
of Karl Jaspers," pp. 256 ff. See also von Rintelen, Beyond Existent-
ialism, pp. 210-211. 
2Jaspers, "R~ply to My Critics," in Schilpp, Jaspers, p. 787. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the function of 
the concept of God in Karl Jaspers' metaphysical philosophy. This 
concept is central to his system, but can only be understood in 
terms of Jaspers' own conception of philosophy, both as a histori-
cally rooted discipline and as an individual quest. The difficulties 
encountered in an attempted interpretation of Jaspers are largely 
due to his own preference for a .. gliding" terminology and an 11open-
ended" system. His own insistence is that aim in philosophy takes 
precedence over method. 
Philosophy is essentially metaphysics, yet it cannot become 
an ontological "science of Being." Philosophy is given its initial 
impetus in the "ultimate situations" of life, but satisfying answers 
are precluded by the partial nature of our knowledge. Epistemological 
dualism, as an ultimate position, is to be overcome in terms of the 
concept of the Encompassing. This is the reality illumined at the 
horizons of our knowledge. It has two major aspects: The being which 
we are and Being Itself. The former has its own modes, which correspond 
to the levels of existence in human life. Empirical existence, or 
Dasein, is factual historicity; consciousness as such, or intellection, 
is the faculty of rationality; spirit, or mind, corresponds to the inte-
grated, total personality. 
As Being Itself, the Encompassing has two modes: The world and 
Transcendence. The world is conceived of as "idea," as not self-explana-
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tory, and as transparent to the Transcendence which speaks through it. 
Transcendence---or God, in religious terms---is both intimately re-
lated to the world and yet distinct from it. Transcendence is il-
lumined in the !£i of transcending (or Existenz), wherein authentic 
personal selfhood is attained. In this unique moment the other modes 
of the subjective Encompassing are aufgehoben in a higher unity. Both 
true freedom and a true consciousness of Transcendence are found in 
the attainment of Existenz. 
Reason is the unifying bond between all modes of the Encom-
passing which we are. It is more than a technical faculty, its chief 
function being to provide the dynamic for inter-personal communication. 
Reason and Existenz are opposite poles, yet they function interdepend-
ently. Truth is primarily a quality of attitude or behavior, although 
there is a sense of truth appropriate to each mode of the Encompassing. 
The highest level of truth is attained in total communication, the 
limit at which Transcendence is also realized most fully. Universal 
statements epitomize the false, especially when they purport to be 
binding upon everyone. 
Symbols, the mediators or vehicles of the speech of Transcend-
ence, speak in a code language which is meaningful only to Existenz. 
All symbols are rooted in phenomenality, yet they share in the reality 
to which they point. To "read" them demands faith, for they are 
rationally inexplicable. When fully comprehended, they lead one, in 
stages of ascent, to an awareness of Transcendence. Yet they remain 
ambiguous, and may well be the cause of deception and disillusionment. 
Only faith itself---especially as activated in moral behavior---can 
10~ 
lead one beyond mere assent to propositions of belief to stability of 
personal existence. To surrender faith is to yield to nihilism. 
The existence of God, while an important philosophical question, 
cannot be ascertained by rationalistic arguments. Neither the cosmo-
logical nor the ontological methods of approach to this question can 
adequately plumb the mystery of Transcendence. Kierkegaard has clari-
fied the leap of faith which all such arguments presuppose or conceal. 
Kierkegaard shows that only a limiting conception of God can be ar-
rived at by rational means alone. Both Jaspers and Kierkegaard agree 
that all discourse about God is encumbered by uncertainties, but 
Jaspers departs from Kierkegaard in holding that s.ymbols may speak 
meaningfully of God. 
God is conceived of as a unity---not numerically, but as the 
paradoxically situated One who both stands over against the world and 
yet embraces it. God is in essence unknowable, and all anthropomorphic 
characteristics which are ascribed to the Deity have symbolic meaning 
only. God cannot be termed a person, despite the evidence of prayer 
and mysticism. Nor is God's relation to the world clear. The Deity 
11creates," but not in an ascertainable way. His relation to the 
historical process is similarly ambiguous. God is the origin and goal 
of history, but he does not break into its flux in a supernatural inter-
vention. Partly because of this, the problem of evil must remain inex-
plicable. Although various answers to this problem have been attempted, 
none comes to grips with it, and none can. Here, as elsewhere, thought 
must admit its limits. 
Traditional theology and established religion are limited by 
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their tendency to pronounce themselves universally valid and authorita-
tive. God cannot be "tied down" or restricted to a particular group. 
No revelation is valid for everyone. Biblical religion, despite its 
profound influence on Western culture, has also succumbed to these 
dangers. Its doctrine of Incarnation must be rejected, since no man 
can be God. Kierkegaard 1 s dictum of credo guia absurdum cannot be ac-
cepted; to do so would seriously endanger individual freedom of mind, 
and would erect a needless barrier between persons of differing beliefs. 
The "Christ myth" is an important historical symbol, but its elevation 
to doctrinal status has yielded unnecessary and tragic consequences. 
Philosophy and religion must strive for communication, despite 
the insoluble differences between them. Although antithetical to one 
another, they are mutually complementary. Philosophy, however, is more 
adequate to the demands of humanity in this age, since religion tends 
to be static and exclusivistic. 
A critical evaluation of Jaspers' philosophy must keep in mind 
his metaphysics as a whole. Both epistemological and theological 
questions need to be raised concerning it. The former are directed 
to Jaspers' refusal to adhere consistently to his assertion that God 
is strictly unknowable. His critique of theology is vitiated by this 
inconsistency; theology and religion are often treated normatively, in 
instances where only a descriptive attitude would seem valid. His con-
ception of truth is 1imi ted by its individuality, as is his notion of 
symbol. Criteria of verification are needed with regard to both. 
Jaspers may finally be a theist, but this hypothesis is rendered 
doubtful by the fact that his primary stress seems to be upon Existenz 
10 
and inter-personal commu~cation. Thus his concept of God is finally 
vitiated by his disallowance of any genuine knovrledge of the Deity. 
107 
